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Punishing the Protectors: The Illinois Domestic
Violence Act Remedy for Victims of Domestic
Violence Against Police Misconduct
Kathryn E. Litchman*
Mentored by Judge Jesse G. Reyes**

I. INTRODUCTION

The last moments of Ronyale White's life were preserved by a
cassette tape she placed in her pocket as her estranged husband, Louis
Although White had
Drexel, threatened her with a loaded gun.'
recently obtained an emergency order of protection against Drexel to
prevent his abuse and harassment, he defied the order and entered her
home unlawfully. 2 As Drexel terrorized her, White called 911 four
times to report that he violated the order and to plead for police
assistance. 3 However, help arrived too late, and White was shot to
. J.D., Loyola University Chicago School of Law, expected May 2008. I would
like to thank
Judge Jesse Reyes for providing valuable insights and guidance; the members of the Loyola Law
Journal for their hard work and attention to detail; and Jan Russel, J.D. and Professor Anita
Weinberg for helping to refine the thesis of this article. Most importantly, I would like to thank
my family and Dimitris Kammer for their unending patience, guidance, love, support, and
motivation.
.. The Honorable Jesse G. Reyes is an Associate Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook
County,
Illinois. He was admitted to the practice of law in Illinois on May 10, 1984, and first took judicial
office on December 2, 1997. He currently serves as the President of the Illinois Judges
Association.
1. Mickey Ciokajlo, $4 Million Offer Told in Suit on 911 Call, CHI. TRIB., June 22, 2006, at 7
(quoting White's final 911 call as saying, "Where are you? Where are you? My husband has a
gun. He's trying to kill me.").
2. Robert A. Clifford, Governmental Immunity: Protectingthe Protectors, CHI. LAWYER, July
2006, at 25 (explaining that it only took two weeks for Drexel to violate the emergency order of
protection issued under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act); Steve Patterson, City to Pay More
Than $4 Million to Family of Murdered Woman, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 22, 2006, at 18; see also
Mary Lystad et al., Domestic Violence, in FAMILY VIOLENCE: A CLINICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE
139, 170-71 (Sandra J. Kaplan ed., 1996) (describing the criticism of civil protection orders as
being merely "pieces of paper," which are easily ignored).
3. Patterson, supra note 2, at 18 (reporting that White called 911 four times between 11:40
and 11:50 p.m., and during the last call, the dispatcher could hear a threatening male voice in the
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death.4 The recording of White's pleas for assistance and the 5sound of
the gunshots that killed her helped to convict Drexel of murder.
In addition to Drexel's criminal culpability in White's death, the
Illinois Supreme Court recently held in Moore v. Green that two
6
Chicago police officers could also be held civilly liable for her murder.
Donald Cornelius and Christopher Green, the first officers to be
dispatched to White's home, took fifteen minutes to respond to the
scene and never entered the house to investigate. Instead, they
inspected their patrol vehicle and made personal calls while Drexel
attacked White. 7 In a wrongful death action against the City of Chicago
and the officers, the executor of White's estate alleged that Cornelius
and Green breached their duties under the Illinois Domestic Violence
Act (IDVA) by failing to respond promptly to White's 911 calls.8 In its
2006 decision, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed past precedent and
held that law enforcement departments and officers could be held liable
9
for willful and wanton conduct in situations of domestic violence.
Consequently, the City of Chicago settled the suit for over $4 million
and the officers were suspended without pay. 10 The death of Ronyale
White is only one of thousands of fatalities attributed annually to the
national epidemic of domestic violence, 11 and her story demonstrates
that inadequate police response to domestic violence altercations is a
12
critical problem that can lead to fatal results.
background).
4. Id. (discussing that the police officers took three times as long to arrive on the scene as they
should have).
5. Jeff Coen, Tapes of Killing Help Convict Husband, Cm. TRIB., Aug. 30, 2005, at 1
(explaining that it only took one hour for the jury to return Drexel's guilty verdict); Stefano
Esposito, "Cold-HeartedMurderer" Convicted Of Killing Wife, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 30, 2005,
at 18.
6. Moore v. Green, 848 N.E.2d 1015, 1018 (Ill.
2006).
7. Rummana Hussain, Council OKs $4.25 Million for Murdered Woman's Kids, CHI. SUNTIMES, June 29, 2006, at 62 (explaining the officers' contentions that they were searching the
neighborhood after they were informed by radio that Drexel had fled the house; supervisors for
the police officers testified that the response should have taken closer to three minutes).
8. Moore, 848 N.E.2d at 1018.
9. Id. at 1023 (affirming Calloway v. Kinkelaar, 659 N.E.2d 1322 (Ill.
1995), in which the
court recognized a cause of action created by § 305 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act).
10. Ciokajlo, supra note 1, at 7.
11. See Lystad, et al., supra note 2, at 140 (referring to the movement in mass media's
characterization of the scale of the domestic violence problem in the United States); STAFF OF S.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 102D CONG., VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A WEEK IN THE LIFE OF
AMERICA (COMM. PRINT 1992) (labeling the domestic violence crisis facing the nation as a
catastrophe and a tragedy, and highlighting the pervasiveness of domestic violence in America).
12. See Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, Introduction, in DO ARRESTS & RESTRAINING
ORDERS WORK? 1, 4 (1996) [hereinafter DO ARRESTS WORK] (explaining that research shows
societal intervention prevents instances of domestic violence from becoming even more
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14
Domestic violence1 3 continues to be a problem of epic proportion.
Despite nationwide state-based legislative reform over the last three
decades, 15 nearly one in three American women reports having been
exposed to domestic violence by a partner at some point in her life.1 6
Such abuse also has a significant impact on law enforcement agencies
and officers, as domestic violence is the single most frequent form of
violence that police encounter on the job. 17 However, despite the
frequency with which police officers encounter domestic violence, the
effectiveness of their response is often inadequate. 18 Although many
police departments have implemented guidelines as to how to treat such
cases, police attitudes about domestic violence are slowly evolving. 19 It
has been suggested that an effective way to remedy the problem of
insufficient police response and to ensure that law enforcement will

dangerous); see also Matthew Litsky, Explaining the Legal System's Inadequate Response to the
Abuse of Women: A Lack of Coordination, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 149, 161-63 (1990)
(stating that arrest is the most effective way to prevent further abuse, and noting that despite
improvements in police response to domestic violence, police policy continues to stress
avoidance of arrest).
13. Domestic violence for the purposes of this paper will be defined as "violence between
adults who are intimates, regardless of their marital status, living arrangement, or sexual
orientations. [The term domestic violence refers to such] minor aggressive acts of throwing,
shoving, and slapping; as well as major aggressive acts of beatings, forced sex, threats with a
deadly weapon, and homicide." Lystad et al., supra note 2, at 139.
14. James T.R. Jones, Battered Spouses' State Law Damage Actions Against the Unresponsive
Police, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 1-3 (1992) (describing spouse abuse as "an immense modem
tragey"); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE
PARTNER VIOLENCE, at iii (2000) (reporting that approximately 1.5 million women are raped
and/or physically assaulted by an intimate partner annually in the United States).
15. Do ARRESTS WORK, supra note 12, at 5; LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE 2 (1992) (outlining legislative efforts as well as the police policy "revolution"
concerning the treatment of domestic violence).
16. Karen Scott Collins et al., HEALTH CONCERNS ACROSS A WOMAN'S LIFESPAN: THE
27
(1999),
OF WOMEN'S HEALTH 8,
FUND 1998 SURVEY
COMMONWEALTH
http://www.cmwf.org/usr-doc/Healthconcems-surveyreport.pdf (citing a study which estimates
that thirty-one percent of women face domestic violence in their lifetime).
17. SHERMAN, supra note 15, at 1. In 2006, the City of Chicago Police Department received
204,729 domestic violence calls, averaging 561 calls per day. CITY OF CHICAGO POLICE
DEPARTMENT, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE QUARTERLY STATISTIC REPORT YEAR TO DATE DEC. 2006
http://egov.cityofchicago.org:80/webportal/COCWebPortal/COCEDITORIAL/DV4QO6.pdf
(2007); Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence 1970-1990, 83 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 46 (1992) (explaining that "[d]omestic disturbance incidents
constitute the largest category of calls received by police each year").
18. See Hollis L. Webster, Enforcement in Domestic Violence Cases, 26 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
663, 663 (1995) (recognizing the legal system's ineffectiveness in dealing with domestic violence
as one of the main reasons the Illinois General Assembly enacted the Illinois Domestic Violence
Act in 1986).
19. STATE OF ILLINOIS, 2005 BASIC POLICE TRAINING CURRICULUM REVALIDATION
PROJECT 97, 99-103 (2004) [hereinafter POLICE TRAINING] (outlining officer duties under the
Illinois Domestic Violence Act and emphasizing domestic violence as a serious crime).
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treat domestic violence as a serious crime would be to expose officers
and law enforcement agencies to2 0civil liability when their conduct falls
short of appropriate intervention.
Traditionally, municipal entities and their employees have enjoyed
immunity from civil claims alleging failure to provide protection
services or adequately perform those services. 2 1 However, in 2005, the
United States Supreme Court held that the determination of how and
when to expose law enforcement to civil liability in an attempt to spur
responsiveness to domestic violence is a policy decision that should be
left to the states. 22 Indeed, most states have addressed the issue of
police immunity and the ability of domestic violence victims to bring
suit against police officers and departments. 23 In Illinois, the legislature
has enacted a domestic violence statute that limits the immunity of law
enforcement personnel in order to encourage the police to carry out their
The Illinois
duties towards victims of intimate partner abuse. 24
Supreme Court interpreted the immunity provision of the Illinois statute
to provide a remedy for victims enabling them to bring suit against the
police who mishandle their case.2 5 This right of action is unique as
compared to the remedies established for domestic violence victims in
other jurisdictions because of the breadth of protection it provides
specifically to domestic violence victims for a wide variety of police
misconduct. 2 6 This Comment suggests that the way in which Illinois
has chosen to address police immunity in situations of domestic
20. Jones, supra note 14, at 4; see also Litsky, supra note 12, at 163-64 (describing an
improvement in law enforcement's treatment of domestic violence calls after police departments
in New York and Connecticut were held liable for inadequate protection).
21. ILLINOIS LAW & PRACTICE § 335 (2006) (describing the various law enforcement acts for
which municipalities are not liable).
22. Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768-69 (2005); see also DeShaney v. Winnebago

County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989) (stating that "[a] State may, through its
courts and legislatures, impose such affirmative duties of care and protection upon its agents as it
wishes"). Laura S. Harper, Battered Women Suing Police for Failure to Intervene: Viable Legal
Avenues After DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 75 CORNELL L.
REv. 1393, 1422 (1990) (discussing the Court's ruling in DeShaney and how state tort claims

may be a successful alternative to a constitutional claim against the police).
23. See infra Part IV.A (discussing select methods by which states have dealt with police
immunity in situations of domestic violence, including mandatory arrest laws, domestic violence

statutes, and the traditional negligence cause of action).
24. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/305 (2004); see infra Part ll (describing the Illinois Domestic

Violence Act and its immunity provision).
25. Calloway v. Kinkelaar, 659 N.E.2d 1322, 1328 (I11. 1995) (recognizing a right of action
when police officers breach their duties to victims by willful and wanton acts or omissions); see

infra Part III (outlining the case law which has expounded upon the meaning of the immunity
provision of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act).
26. See infra Part IV.B (comparing Illinois' treatment of police immunity in situations of

domestic violence to the varying treatments in California, Washington and New York).
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violence provides
more complete legal protection for victims than other
27
states provide.

This Comment examines Illinois law concerning the type of
immunity granted to law enforcement officials who respond to
situations of domestic violence and compares Illinois to three other
jurisdictions with respect to the civil remedies available to domestic
violence victims who suffer police misconduct. 28 Although domestic
violence victims have successfully recovered damages by asserting
federal constitutional and statutory claims, 29 this Comment focuses

solely on state-based statutory and common law tort claims.30 Part H of
this Comment illustrates the impact of domestic violence on the nation

and Illinois, and discusses the role of law enforcement officials in
deterring and responding to intimate partner abuse. 3 1 Part II also
explores the evolution of tort immunity statutes for governmental agents
in Illinois. 32 Part III describes the statutory scheme developed in
Illinois surrounding domestic violence. 33 This Part also analyzes recent
Illinois case law that limits law enforcement immunity in occurrences of
domestic violence where police conduct is willful and wanton. 34 Part
IV then analyzes Illinois law enforcement immunity in comparison to
the domestic violence laws established in three other states and outlines
the positive and negative aspects of the differing treatment. 35 Part IV
also argues that the right of action provided for victims of domestic
violence in Illinois surpasses the legal remedies available to victims in

27. Id.
28. See infra Parts Il and IV (examining Illinois law with regard to police immunity,
outlining the ability of victims of domestic violence to bring suit against the police for
misconduct, and comparing this law with that of other states).
29. Harper, supra note 22, at 1393-94 (noting that domestic violence victims have achieved
varying levels of success when asserting that police failed to protect their constitutional rights,
and suggesting that equal protection claims may be more promising than due process claims); See
Jones, supra note 14, at 56-57 (explaining the success of some abused women in bringing federal
equal protection claims if the police misconduct is related to gender-based classifications).
30. See infra Parts III and IV (discussing statutory and common law negligence claims in
Illinois and three other states).
31. See infra Part II (depicting the nature of the crime of domestic violence and the role of the
police in dealing with abusers and victims).
32. See infra Part II.C (expounding on Illinois history of absolute immunity, the public duty
doctrine, the special relationship exception, and the Illinois Tort Immunity Act).
33. See infra Part III.A (describing in detail the Illinois Domestic Violence Act).
34. See infra Part I1I.B (examining Illinois Supreme Court and appellate court rulings which
have created and affirmed the cause of action for victims of domestic violence against police
officers who breach their duties under the IDVA).
35. See infra Part IV (describing the civil remedies for victims of domestic violence in other
states with respect to law enforcement).
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these three other states. 3 6 Finally, Part V proposes several ways to
encourage additional systemic change and modified police conduct.3 7 It
to bring
also suggests means to further strengthen the right of victims
38
suit against individual police officers and their departments.
II. BACKGROUND
The concept of law enforcement immunity in Illinois has evolved
significantly over the last forty years. 3 9 In order to understand the
significance of the immunity provision of the IDVA and recent case law
defining the limited immunity it provides, it is important to understand
the legal history behind the concept of governmental immunity in
Illinois. 4 ° Additionally, some background knowledge about domestic
violence and the role that law enforcement plays nationally and in
Illinois is required in order to comprehend why limited immunity for
41
police is necessary to protect victims of domestic violence.
Accordingly, this Part first provides an overview of domestic violence
as a national problem.4 2 Next, this Part discusses the role that law
43
enforcement officers play in the efforts to combat domestic violence.
Finally, this Part describes the statutory and common law history of
44
sovereign immunity in Illinois.
A. Domestic Violence Is a National Problem
Domestic violence has existed throughout human history and has
been documented as far back as the Roman Empire. 45 The problem is
36. See infra Part IV.B (evaluating the strengths and weakness of the Illinois laws and
comparing Illinois to other states).
37. See infra Part V (suggesting additional legislative and judicial action to provide incentives
for better law enforcement response to domestic violence).
38. See infra Part V (proposing methods for making more accessible remedies for victims who
choose to bring suit for police misconduct).
39. See infra Part Il.C (outlining the evolution of common law and statutory immunity with
respect to municipal entities and their employees).
40. Id. (recounting the evolution of municipal immunity in Illinois).
41. See infra Parts lI.A-B (explaining the prevalence of domestic violence in the United
States and Illinois and describing the important role police play in curbing rates of recidivism).
42. See infra Part II.A (describing the nature of domestic violence as a crime).
43. See infra Part II.B (discussing in detail proper police conduct with respect to domestic
violence incidents and explaining reasons why such conduct is not carried out).
44. See infra Part II.C (explaining the creation of common law sovereign immunity, its
abolishment by the Illinois Constitution of 1970, and the subsequent adoption of the Illinois Tort
Immunity Act).
45. Kathleen K. Curtis, The Supreme Court's Attack on Domestic Violence LegislationDiscretion, Entitlement, and Due Process in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez, 32 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1181, 1184 (2006); see also Arthur L. Rizer, III, Mandatory Arrest: Do We
Need to Take a Closer Look?, 36 UWLA L. REV. 1, 2 (2005) (explaining the "rule of thumb" in
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also deeply rooted in American culture. 46
The early colonial
settlements in America enacted laws that sanctioned violence against
one's wife and children. 47 In fact, at that time, family violence was not
only legal but expected, as society deemed it the man's role to use
physical power to ensure that his wife followed certain standards of
behavior. 4 8 It was not until the end of the nineteenth century that
domestic violence and spousal abuse were criminalized in the United
States. 4 9 Still, it was treated as a private issue within the family and
was seldom reported to law enforcement. 50 When incidents were called
in to police, abusive husbands were often told by responding officers to
simply take time to cool off. 5 1 The burgeoning women's liberation
movement of the 1960s and 1970s finally brought the issue to the public
consciousness and helped give voice to the silent victims of family
52
violence.
which a husband was allowed to beat his wife with a stick as long as it was no thicker than his
thumb).
46. See State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, 1874 WL 2346, at *1-2 (N.C. 1874), in which the
Supreme Court of North Carolina rationalized the existence of domestic violence by stating:
[I]n order to preserve the sanctity of the domestic circle, the Courts will not listen to
trivial complaints. If no permanent injury has been inflicted, nor malice, cruelty nor
dangerous violence shown by the husband, it is better to draw the curtain, shut out the
public gaze, and leave the parties to forget and forgive.
Id.
47. EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
RESPONSE 23-24 (1990) [hereinafter CRIMINAL JUSTICE] (quoting early court decisions which
affirmed that a "husband was legally permitted to chastise his wife without subjecting himself to
vexatious prosecutions for assault and battery," (quoting L. LERMAN, PROSECUTION FOR SPOUSE
ABUSE INNOVATIONS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE (1981))); DEL MARTIN, BATrERED
WIvES 31 (1976) (illustrating the legality of domestic violence in the nineteenth century United
States by recounting a North Carolina court's holding that the judiciary should not "interfere with
family government in trifling cases," which resulted in the acquittal of the abusive husband).
48. CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 23-24 (describing moderate violence by the family
patriarch as a Puritanical value believed to be necessary for following the correct path to
salvation).
49. See generally Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143 (1871) (making Alabama the first state to
make spousal abuse illegal by holding "the privilege, ancient though it be, to beat her with a stick,
to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like
indignities, is not now acknowledged by our law"); Rizer, supra note 45, at 3-4 (discussing the
progress by which domestic violence became illegal throughout the United States).
50. Curtis, supra note 45, at 1185.
51. Raymond I. Parnas, The Police Response to the Domestic Violence Disturbance, 1967
Wis. L. REV. 914, 935-36 (1967) (quoting a 1965 Chicago Police Department training manual in
which officers were instructed to suggest that the man leave the home for the night as "most
domestic quarrels quiet down before the next morning").
52. See Curtis, supra note 45, at 1185-86 (crediting women's rights advocates with
successfully developing grassroots programs to help victims escape their abuser); Marion
Wanless, Mandatory Arrest: A Step Toward EradicatingDomestic Violence, But Is It Enough?,
1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 533, 536 (1996) (describing the feminist movement as "the genesis for
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1. The Difficulty of Quantifying the Prevalence of the Crime
The extent to which the problem of domestic violence still exists is
not fully understood. 5 3 Formal statistics on the prevalence of domestic
violence are difficult to collect for a variety of reasons. 54 First,
55
institutional hurdles impede the assessment of the size of the problem.
For instance, police departments and service agencies in the past have
had ineffective and inconsistent systems for record-keeping. 5 6 Further
complicating the issue, instances of domestic violence are not always
57
categorized as such by law enforcement or health care providers.
Additionally, some victims use multiple services after an altercation and
are documented by each agency, making it difficult to compare statistics
from the police, hospitals, and shelters to determine how many
58
individual disturbances actually took place.
Perhaps the most significant obstacle to understanding the
pervasiveness of domestic violence is the nature of the victim and the
crime itself.59 Many women choose not to report incidents of abuse
because of social embarrassment or fear of retribution from their

changing societal and legal responses to domestic violence).
53. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 19 (hypothesizing the reason for differences
between survey results and discussing the difficulty of understanding these disparities); See
Lystad et al., supra note 2, at 140 (explaining that the sociological study of domestic violence is
relatively young); M. Mercedes Fort, A New Tort: Domestic Violence Gets the Status it Deserves

in Jewitt v. Jewitt, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 355, 358 (1997) (claiming that while scholars are trying to
understand the nature of a violent relationship, there are still no reliable statistics on the
prevalence of domestic violence).
54.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 20-21 (outlining in detail the difficulties presented

in collecting statistics about the prevalence of domestic violence); see also U.S. GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-148R, PREVALENCE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, SEXUAL

STALKING 2 (2006) ("No single, comprehensive effort
currently exists that provides nationwide statistics on the prevalence of [domestic violence].").
55. CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 20-21.
56. Id. (describing the lack of an effective mechanism for coordinating data collected by
various service agencies despite the enactment of laws requiring more thorough record-keeping
with regard to the incidence of domestic violence).
57. Id. at 21 (attributing inaccurate statistics to the habitual "down-grading" of calls by police
officers who minimize the severity of domestic violence cases); see also G. Kristian Miccio,
ASSAULT, DATING VIOLENCE, AND

Notes from the Underground: Battered Women, the State, and Conceptions of Accountability, 23

L.J. 133, 158 (2000) (describing the practice in the Los Angeles County
Sheriffs Department of not classifying domestic violence 911 calls as emergency status thus
diminishing priority treatment); and Parnas, supra note 51, at 914 n.2 (reporting that, in the past,
the Chicago police department classified domestic violence as "disturbances" grouped together
with teen disruptions and party noise).
58. CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 21.
HARV. WOMEN'S

59.

Id. at 20-21; Ellen Pence, The Duluth Domestic Abuse Intervention Project, 6 HAMLINE

L. REV. 247, 249-50 (1983) (explaining the nature of the relationship between abuser and
victim).
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Additionally, some victims choose not to rely on law

enforcement for protection because of past encounters in which the
police failed to respond properly or promptly. 6 1 Victims may avoid
reporting an incident because they do not want to subject their abusers
to the criminal justice system, or because they cannot afford to have
their abusers incarcerated for financial or practical reasons. 62 Underreporting of domestic violence prevents the collection of reliable data
63
about the frequency with which family violence occurs.
Furthermore, because the rate of recidivism for abuse is particularly
high with domestic violence, some victims become "regulars" in the
eyes of the police. 64 Unlike victims of other forms of violent crime, the
risk of retaliatory abuse is increased for battered individuals because of
the nature of their relationship with their abuser. 65 Victims of assault
perpetrated by a stranger rarely encounter their assailant again, while
domestic violence victims are typically involved in a relationship, live
with, or are economically and emotionally dependent upon their

60. MARTIN, supra note 47, at 11-12 (stating that legal experts categorize domestic violence
as one of the most underreported crimes in the United States); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 7 (2000) [hereinafter INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE] (explaining
that the most commonly cited reasons for not reporting domestic violence to the police was the
"private or personal" nature of the matter, and adding that nineteen percent of female victims did
not report their victimization to the police for fear of reprisal by the perpetrator).
61. Jane F. Golden, Mutual Orders of Protection in New York State Family Offense
Proceedings, 18 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 309, 311 (1987) (describing an increase in litigation
by domestic violence victims against law enforcement for inadequate response); Kit Kinports &
Karla Fischer, Orders of Protection in Domestic Violence Cases: An Empirical Assessment of the
Impact of the Reform Statutes, 2 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 163, 223-24 (1993) (explaining that many
women choose not to extend orders of protection because of inadequate enforcement by police
departments).
62. INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, supra note 60, at 7 (documenting that about one in ten
male victims and fewer than one in ten female victims said they did not report the abuse to the
police because they did not want to get the offender in trouble with the law). See also Anne C.
Johnson, From House to Home: Creating A Right to Early Lease Termination for Domestic
Violence Victims, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1859, 1862 (2005) (explaining that some abused women are
financially dependent on their abusers or would become homeless if they escaped abuse or had
the abuser arrested).
63. See INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, supra note 60, at 7 (stating that only about half of all
victims of intimate partner violence reported the violence to law enforcement authorities).
64. See Wanless, supra note 52, at 546-47 (explaining how incidents of domestic violence are
not isolated occurrences and describing the cycle of violence that leads to repeat attacks); D.J.
DAWSON & J. DAVID HIRSCHEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN:
SYNTHESIS OF RESEARCH FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS 4 (2000) (stating that "[a] small
percentage of households generate a large percentage of domestic violence calls.").
65. Barbara Hart, Battered Women & The Criminal Justice System, in DO ARRESTS &
RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK 98, 100 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996)
(contrasting a battered woman to victims of other types of violent crimes).
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abuser. 66 Thus, in trying to ascertain the number of households afflicted
by domestic violence, it is difficult to accurately assess the number of
victims based on statistics of requests for service because many of the
67
requests are made by repeat callers.
2. Domestic Violence Is a Large Societal Problem Both
Nationally and in Illinois
Despite uncertainty about how many people are affected by domestic
68
Victims of
violence, it is certain that this problem is pervasive.
intimate partner abuse can be found in all social, ethnic, and racial
groups. 69 Although both women and men are victims of abuse, the rates
of victimization are significantly higher for women. 70 Studies estimate
66. Id. See also Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System's Response to Battering:
Understanding the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REV. 267, 306 (1985)
(explaining the principles that should guide the legal systems treatment of domestic violence).
In responding to abuse, the law should emphasize the nature of the harm done, and not
the relationship between the parties. While it is proper to stress the similarities
between domestic violence and crimes between strangers when dealing with the
batterer, the law must recognize the difference between the two when dealing with the
victim. Because of her relationship with the perpetrator, the battered woman will find it
difficult to pursue legal remedies against him, much more difficult than does the victim
who has not been rendered helpless by the criminal.
Id.
67. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 20-21 (reporting the difficulty in translating raw
police data into an accurate representation of how many individual altercations take place); U.S.
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 54, at 19 (distinguishing between domestic
violence statistics calculating incidence versus prevalence and contending that both are necessary
for understanding the extent to which resources are needed for victims of intimate partner abuse).

68. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, & CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE
PARTNER VIOLENCE iii-v (2000) [hereinafter CONSEQUENCES] (describing that findings about the
frequency and scope of domestic violence suggest that it is a serious criminal justice and public
health concern).
69. Lystad et al., supra note 2, at 140; Illinois State Police, Facts and Myths About Domestic
Violence, http://www.isp.state.il.us/crime/dvfactsmyths.cfm (last visited Apr. 5, 2007) (verifying
the diversity of individuals who are affected by domestic violence); Michelle Aulivola, Outing
Domestic Violence, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 162, 162 (2004) (noting that domestic violence occurs at
approximately the same frequency in same-sex and heterosexual couples). But see INTIMATE
PARTNER VIOLENCE, supra note 60, at 3 (reporting that between 1993 and 1998, women who
were young, black, single, low income earning, or living in an urban area were more likely to be
victimized by an intimate partner), and Jennifer Rios, What's the Hold-Up? Making the Case for
Lifetime Orders of Protection in New York State, 12 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 709, 713 (2006)
(discussing

the

higher

rate

of domestic

violence

in

socio-economically

disadvantaged

neighborhoods).
70.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIME DATA BRIEF,

INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 1993-2001 1 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/pub/pdf/ipv0l.pdf [hereinafter CRIME DATA BRIEF] (stating that in 2001, women accounted
for eighty-five percent of the victims of intimate partner violence); Patricia Tjaden & Nancy
Thoennes, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE AND CONSEQUENCES OF
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

2007]

Punishing the Protectors

that annually, one-tenth to one-fifth of women in the United States are
beaten by their intimate partner, totaling between four and six million
women each year.7 1 In fact, intimate partner abuse has been credited as
the leading cause of serious injury to women.7 2 Annually, it accounts
73
for more injuries than rape, car accidents, and muggings combined.
The U.S. Surgeon General has reported that one-fifth of all hospital
74
emergency room cases are attributed to domestic violence.

Although women constitute a large majority of the victims of
intimate partner abuse, women are not the only segment of society
afflicted by domestic violence. 75 The Department of Justice found that

male victims of domestic violence constitute one-third of all homicides
committed by intimate partners. 76 Additionally, in homes where
77
intimate partner abuse occurs, children are also likely to be victims.
At least one study found that between fifty and seventy percent of
batterers who abuse an adult partner also abuse the children in the
relationship. 78 Further, domestic violence is not isolated to heterosexual
relationships. 7 9 Studies have documented that between 50,000 and

100,000 lesbians and as many as half a million gays are victimized by a
80
partner each year.

SURVEY 7 (1998) (stating that women are seven to fourteen times more likely than their male
counterparts to report suffering severe physical assault from an intimate partner). See also Illinois
State Police, supra note 69 (reporting that at least ninety-five percent of all cases of partner abuse
involve a man beating a woman). Cf Melody M. Crick, Access Denied: The Problem of Abused
Men in Washington, 27 SEAT7LE U. L. REV. 1035 (2004) (exploring the legal obstacles faced by
male victims of domestic violence).
71. Fort, supra note 53, at 358; Johnson, supra note 62, at 1861; Waits, supra note 66, at 273.
72. Rios, supra note 69, at 713; Johnson, supra note 62, at 1861 ("In reality, a woman in the
United States is abused every seven seconds, regardless of her culture, race, occupation, income
level, or age.").
73. Fort, supra note 53, at 358; Litsky, supra note 12, at 149.
74. Zorza, supra note 17, at 46.
75. Rios, supra note 69, at 712.
76. Crick, supra note 70, at 1043-44 ("While eight of every 1,000 women are victims of
intimate partner violence, one of every 1,000 men is also a victim .... Even more frightening is
the estimate that as many as ninety percent of abused men do not report domestic violence waged
against them by women partners.").
77. Rios, supra note 69, at 713 ("The abuse of children is generally less severe than the abuse
of the female partner, but as the violence against the partner gets worse, so does the abuse against
the child.").
78. Id.
79. Aulivola, supra note 69, at 162 ("Studies show that domestic violence among same-sex
couples occurs at approximately the same statistical frequency and has many of the same
characteristics as domestic violence among heterosexual couples .... On average, studies show
the incidence of violence in heterosexual relationships to be between 25% and 33%.").
80. Id.
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In abusive relationships, incidents of battery often recur frequently,
monthly or even daily. 8 1 Research suggests that thirty-two percent of
victims are re-victimized within a relatively short period of time if
proper intervention is not carried out. 82 A survey compiled by the
American Medical Association reports that "forty-seven percent of
husbands who beat their wives do so three or more times per year and
that rape is a common occurrence in fifty-four percent of violent
marriages." 83 The injuries incurred by victims of intimate partner abuse
are usually greater than injuries inflicted by strangers, 84 and the danger
increases if the victim is pregnant. 85 Knives, guns, or other weapons are
used in thirty percent of domestic violence incidences. 86 Domestic
violence disturbances also tend to become more violent and dangerous
87
over time.

It is not uncommon for intimate partner violence to escalate to the
point of fatality. 88

Law enforcement agencies have been able to

81. Zorza, supra note 17, at 46. See also Rizer, supra note 45, at 6 ("Fifty-five percent of the
husbands questioned admitted that they had hit their wives at least once, and 25% said they had
hit their wives from six times a year to daily."); Wanless, supra note 52, at 546 ("One in five
women victimized by a spouse or an ex-spouse reports that she has been the victim of a series of
three or more assaults in the last six months that were so similar she could not distinguish one
from another.")
82. CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 9; ILLINOIS COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE, ACHIEVING ACCOUNTABILITY IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
FOR REDUCING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 7 (2005) [hereinafter ACHIEVING ACCOUNTABILITY]

(reporting research results showing that without prompt law enforcement response, minor assaults
often escalate into domestic homicides).
83. Fort, supra note 53, at 358.
84. Litsky, supra note 12, at 149. See also Zorza, supra note 17, at 46 ("The injuries women
sustain in these attacks are at least as serious as those suffered in violent felony crimes.").
85. Fort, supra note 53, at 358 ("The most common injuries are to the head, face, neck, breast
or abdomen, and the risk of injury increases sharply during pregnancy.").
86. Zorza, supra note 17, at 46. See also Waits, supra note 66, at 274 (discussing the
frequency with which weapons are used in domestic assaults); Rios, supra note 69, at 714 ("Most
women killed at the hands of partners or former partners were either shot (nearly forty percent) or
stabbed (thirty-one percent). Women who were stabbed to death were two times more likely to
have been killed by an intimate partner than by a non-intimate partner.").
87. ALEX R. PIQUERO ET AL., ASSESSING THE OFFENDING ACTIVITY OF CRIMINAL DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE SUSPECTS: OFFENSE SPECIALIZATION, ESCALATION, AND DE-ESCALATION EVIDENCE
FROM THE SPOUSE ASSAULT REPLICATION PROGRAM 11 (2005) (outlining studies that show that

intimate partner violence increases in frequency and severity over time). See also Wanless, supra
note 52, at 549 (describing how violence escalates rapidly after a woman attempts to leave or end
her abusive relationship).
88. Waits, supra note 66, at 274 ("[The batterer may finally kill his victim, she may kill him,
or one or the other of them may commit suicide in order to escape an unbearable situation."). See
also Wanless, supra note 52, at 542 ("Despite measures implemented to assist victims (such as
mediation and joint counseling) and to make the criminal justice system more responsive (such as
granting police the power to make warrantless misdemeanor arrests) domestic violence has not
decreased. The homicide rate for women murdered by their husbands or boyfriends remained
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89
accurately track the number of domestic-violence-related homicides.
Each year, at least one-fifth of all homicides are committed within
families or intimate relationships. 90 More than half of American
women who are murdered are killed by a partner or ex-partner. 9 1 The
U.S. Department of Justice Statistics reports that 1,300 women are
92
murdered each year during domestic altercations.
Economically, domestic violence is also devastating. 9 3 More than
half of homeless women are escapees of domestic violence. 94 Lost
wages, absenteeism, and sick leave due to family violence cost the

American economy more than $100 million annually, with an additional

95
five billion dollars spent on medical expenses for victims each year.
Domestic violence is equally prevalent in Illinois. 96 A domestic
97
violence altercation is reported once every four minutes in the state.

In 2005, there were thirty-six homicides committed by intimate partners
nearly constant from 1977 to 1992: 1.6 per 100,000 population in 1977 as compared to 1.5 in
1992.").
89. NEAL MILLER, INST. FOR LAW & JUSTICE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A REVIEW OF STATE
LEGISLATION DEFINING POLICE AND PROSECUTION DUTIES AND POWERS 1 (2004), availableat
http://ilj.org/publications/DV_.Legislation-3.pdf. See also DO ARRESTS WORK, supra note 12, at
1 (describing criminal justice statistics regarding serious domestic violence incidents as
unreliable); CRIME DATA BRIEF, supra note 70, at 2 (calculating that three women on average are
killed by their intimate partners each day in the United States).
90. Golden, supra note 61, at 309. See also Rizer, supra note 45, at 6 ("One such study
showed that 12.5% of all murders were cases of one spouse killing the other.").
91. Do ARRESTS WORK, supra note 12, at 3. See also Rios, supra note 69, at 713 (stating that
between 1976 and 1996, one third of all women murdered during that time were killed by a
current or former intimate partner).
92. Rios, supra note 69, at 713 ("Between 1976 and 1996, approximately one third of all
women who were homicide victims in the United States were killed by current or former intimate
partners. Furthermore, women make up the vast majority of all intimate partner homicides
victims; in 1998, women constituted seventy-two percent of all intimate partner homicide
victims.").
93. See Fort, supra note 53, at 359 (estimating the economic cost of domestic violence to
society as significant).
94. Johnson, supra note 62, at 1862.
95. See Rios, supra note 69, at 715 (explaining that the cost to society also includes mental
health care services and lost earnings for victims of domestic violence over a lifetime); Wanless,
supra note 52, at 563 (citing that the 100,000 hospitalization days and 30,000 emergency room
visits annually are the result of domestic violence); BONNIE CARLSON ET AL., VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN: SYNTHESIS OF RESEARCH FOR PRACTITIONERS 17 (2000) available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/199577.pdf
(reporting that forty percent of the
economic impact of domestic violence is attributed to medical expenses and another forty-four
percent stems from property loss caused by violence in the home).
96. ILLINOIS STATE POLICE, ANNUAL UNIFORM CRIME REPORT 208 (2005).
97. Id. (stating that there were 115,282 domestic violence offenses reported to the Crime
Report Program during 2005); NATIONAL COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ILLINOIS
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FACTS, http://www.ncadv.org/files/lllinois.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2007)
[hereinafter Facts].
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98
and 3,728 violations of orders of protection reported in Illinois.
Service providers throughout the state assisted close to 50,000 adult
victims of domestic violence in 2004 and ninety-five percent of those
individuals were women. 9 9 Although current statistics regarding
domestic violence in Illinois exist, little is known about the history of
family violence in the state or the progress that has been made over time
because the Illinois Uniform Crime Report did not collect statistics
specific to domestic violence until 1996.100
National awareness of the vast and costly consequences of domestic
violence began to increase in the 1960s. 10 1 Advocates and legislators
recognized the inadequacy of the services and protections provided for
victims, 10 2 and a wave of legal reform evolved to address these
systemic flaws. 10 3 National and state legislatures enacted mandatory
arrest laws, criminal sanctions for acts of partner abuse, and increased

civil remedies. 10 4 By the 1980s, forty-nine jurisdictions had created
legislation implementing a revised standard for police interaction with
instances of domestic violence. 10 5 However, despite almost forty years
of conscious effort to implement laws and public policy encouraging
more effective and thorough services, advocates still debate what
constitutes the appropriate law enforcement response to domestic

violence. 106
98. Facts, supra note 97 (adding that Illinois service programs answered 203,204 hotline calls
and provided 272,651 days of shelter to victims of domestic violence and their children).
99. ILLINOIS COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, FACT SHEET DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
STATISTICS, http://www.ilcadv.org (last visited Apr. 5, 2007) (click on link "Illinois Domestic
Violence Service Statistics") [hereinafter Illinois Coalition Against Domestic Violence].
100. ILLINOIS UNIFORM CRIME REPORT, CRIME IN ILLINOIS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 11
(2003).
101. See Rios, supra note 69, at 715 (describing how states began to enact legislation to
protect victims of domestic violence and to grant them more rights); Rizer, supra note 45, at 6
(describing the social movement that focused on supporting domestic violence victims).
102. Golden, supra note 61, at 311.
103. Lystad, supra note 2, at 167. See also Litsky, supra note 12, at 152-53 (noting that
typical legislation fell into two categories, "(1) laws allowing victims to obtain protective orders
against abusers and (2) laws providing aid to supportive services .... ).
104. See Lystad, supra note 2, at 167-71 (outlining the methods of reform which also
included adoption of policies for overnight incarceration and civil remedies such as ex parte
emergency orders of protection). Wanless, supra note 52, at 534 (listing the fifteen states that
had enacted mandatory arrest laws).
105. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 12 (describing these changes as a result of
societal pressure to take legislative action); Kinports & Fischer, supra note 61, at 165 (discussing
the trend of states to enact legislation permitting civil orders of protection and explaining the
criminal sanctions associated with violation of these orders).
106. Lystad, supra note 2, at 167; CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 69-70 (discussing the
ever-changing philosophies of advocates and legislators as to what is the proper role of law
enforcement). See Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1740
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B. Role of Police in Situations of Domestic Violence
The role of law enforcement agencies and officers in the prevention
and treatment of domestic violence is crucial. 10 7 Police departments are
called upon to aid victims of abuse far more than any other service
provider. 10 8 Police officers and departments provide free protection
services that are available day and night. 10 9 Officers are uniquely
qualified to defuse heated and violent situations and are trained to
provide support and address safety issues. 1 10 Additionally, police
attention in the event a
officers are armed and can provide life-saving
I l1
domestic disturbance escalates to violence.
Police officers also function as legitimate authority figures with the
power to impose criminal sanctions. 1 12 The courts rely upon law
(2006) (reporting that domestic violence policy makers have not reached a consensus as to the
proper role of law enforcement officials in curtailing domestic violence).
107. David A. Ford et al., Future Directions for Criminal Justice Policy on Domestic
Violence, in Do ARRESTS WORK 243, 250-51 (explaining the importance of law enforcement in
reducing the number of incidents of domestic violence and the existence of a public sentiment
that police are responsible and capable of providing protection to victims).
108. CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 10 (citing that police intervene in as many as
fourteen percent of domestic altercations and that the frequency of this contact is far more than
with any other type of agency). See also Litsky, supra note 12, at 160-61 (describing how police
involvement in domestic violence calls exceeds their combined responses to murder, rape, and all
other forms of aggravated assault).
109. CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 10. See also MARTIN, supra note 47, at 92
(highlighting the technological sophistication of law enforcement agencies which lead to
beneficial communication and mobility capabilities).
110. POLICE TRAINING, supra note 19, at 99-101 (describing the steps a properly trained
police officer should take when responding to a domestic violence call); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, FIRST RESPONSE TO VICTIMS OF CRIME HANDBOOK 15
(2001) [hereinafter HANDBOOK], availableat http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/infores/
firstrep/2001/NCJ189631.pdf (describing the primary responsibilities for law enforcement when
responding to domestic violence calls, including providing physical safety for victims and
coordinating referrals to support services).
111. See DAWSON, supra note 64, at 2 (listing the possible actions that a police officer must
consider in responding to a domestic violence call).
When a call for police assistance is placed, the responding officer(s) must determine
what has occurred and the validity of the citizen complaint. The response must fit with
the facts and what the law allows. The officer(s) may need to administer emergency
medical care and/or summon an ambulance. The officer(s) may need to calm the
situation and restrain the offender. The officer(s) may give appropriate advice
regarding legal issues and victim support services. If the offender is not arrested at the
scene, the victim may be given assistance in obtaining an arrest warrant or a protection
order. The victim may also be transported to another location, such as a relative's
home or a shelter.
Id. But see Rios, supra note 69, at 728 (challenging the conclusions of studies finding that orders
of protection are effective).
112. See Miccio, supra note 57, at 148 (discussing the responsibilities of law enforcement
arising from their level of expertise).
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enforcement officials to enforce orders of protection issued against
abusers by giving warnings and making arrests if necessary.ll3 Studies
have shown that abuse is significantly reduced if protective orders are
1 14
properly enforced.

Despite the critical role of law enforcement in deterring domestic
violence and the positive effects that can be achieved through police
involvement, police officers are frequently criticized for providing
inadequate services in response to domestic violence calls. 115 Failure to
meet appropriate standards of conduct may have to do with the policing

institution's long history of "benevolent neglect" to victims of spousal
abuse. 116 Before advocates and legislators actively sought to change
policies regarding the policing of domestic disturbances, arrest statistics
demonstrated that police officers generally left domestic disputes to be
worked out on their own, employing arrest only as a last resort. 117 In
fact, the majority of law enforcement agencies in Illinois still had
policies against arrest in domestic violence situations in the late
1970s. 118 Despite the notable increase in domestic violence legislation,
11 9
advocates assert that police attitudes are only slowly changing.
113. See Litsky, supra note 12, at 162-63 (noting that the arrest power of police is the
"linchpin" of prevention of domestic violence because it communicates societal disapproval of
spousal abuse while simultaneously protecting victims from further violence).
114. See Kinports & Fischer, supra note 61, at 221-28 (discussing extensively the need for
prompt and consistent enforcement of orders of protection by law enforcement and highlighting
the problems that currently exist with enforcement, such as delayed service, failure to warn
abuser of criminal sanctions, and lack of follow-through on punishment and arrest).
115. See Miccio, supra note 57, at 158 (stating that the Violence Against Women Act of 1994
was created in part because of the pervasive problem of police inaction in situations of domestic
violence and citing several studies in Texas and California supporting that contention); Kinports
& Fischer, supra note 61, at 220 (labeling insufficient enforcement of and response to violations
of orders of protection as the "Achilles' heel" of the order protection process).
116. CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 11; Damon Phillips, Civil Protection Orders:
Issues in Obtainment, Enforcement and Effectiveness, 61 J. Mo. B. 29, 33 (2005) (describing a
history of apathy towards domestic violence by police departments and linking apathy to officer
attitudes that domestic violence is less serious than other crimes). See also RICHARD TOON ET
AL., MORRISON INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, LAYERS OF MEANING: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
AND
LAW
ENFORCEMENT
ATTITUDES
IN ARIZONA
2
(2005),
available at
http://www.morrisoninstitute.org (explaining the police practice of categorizing domestic
violence calls as "disturbance calls," which were handled with minimal intervention).
117. See Wanless, supra note 52, at 545-46 (discussing how police are often reluctant to
arrest perpetrators because of personal bias concerning domestic violence); TOON, supra note
116, at 2 (outlining changes in the law enforcement approach to domestic violence calls since the
advent of nation-wide legislation).
118. SHERMAN, supra note 15, at 26. New York State also had similar policies against arrest
until 1978. Id.
119. ACHIEVING ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 82, at 2 (explaining that despite the
implementation of revised law enforcement and prosecutorial techniques, change is slow, and
everyday practice remains the same despite new laws); David A. Slansky, Not Your Father's
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Research has shown that regardless of the policy or law in place, police
often rely on their own experience and beliefs in making decisions
while on the job. 12 0 Consequently, laws dealing with domestic violence
12 1
and how to treat victims and perpetrators remain under-enforced.
The under-enforcement of domestic violence laws is often blamed
upon findings that show that some police officers simply feel that
responding to disputes within the home is not a legitimate responsibility
of law enforcement personnel. 12 2 Domestic violence calls usually
require some counseling of the victim and the perpetrator, and some
officers find this beyond their training or skills. 123 Even though police
departments throughout the country have adopted policies that require a
certain level of attention to domestic violence disturbances, and many
officers no longer treat intimate partner abuse with apathy, examples of
such officer misconduct continue to exist. 124 This persistence in
Police Department:Making Sense of the New Demographics of Law Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1209, 1209 (2006) (describing police institutions as having changed very little
in the last thirty years). See also DAWSON, supra note 64, at 3 (reporting that research from
several jurisdictions demonstrates slow changes in attitudes and policy).
120. Wanless, supra note 52, at 544 (describing the rationale given by police for not making
arrests). Police are reluctant to arrest when called to domestic disturbances even if they serve in a
state that grants them the power of warrantless arrest. Id. See also CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra
note 47, at 43-44 (citing a variety of reasons for law enforcement aversion to arrest, such as the
victim's preferences or the officer's evaluation of the victim's conduct and the assailant's
demeanor).
121. See Pence, supra note 59, at 248 (reciting statistics on the infrequency with which police
officers make arrests and write reports based on domestic violence calls); SHERMAN, supra note
15, at 26, 36 (describing the practice of law enforcement as highly discretionary and explaining
that under-enforcement still occurs even if failure to enforce the law violates official departmental
policies).
122. See Phillips, supra note 116, at 33 (describing the common police mentality that
domestic violence is a less serious form of crime); CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 27-28
(claiming that police officers prefer law enforcement functions where the likelihood of action and
arrest are higher).
123. See Wanless, supra note 52, at 547 (explaining that police officers are trained to enforce
laws and not to serve as psychologist or social workers); Development in the Law-Legal
Response to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1498, 1535-36 (1993) (describing how
historically the police were trained to treat domestic disturbance calls as mediations); CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 27-28 ("[It has long been noted that police are socialized from their
earliest occupational training into a culture that doesn't highly value 'social work' roles.").
124. CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 26. See also Phillips, supra note 116, at 33,
describing one example of police refusal to interfere with a situation of family violence and the
consequences of such inaction:
A court issued an order of protection June 12, 1985 against Anthony Swiggett. "Less
than two weeks [later he] was arrested for violating the order." On September 5 of that
year, "police officers responded to a 911 call from" Swiggett's wife that he "had
violated the order of protection again by entering her [house] and throwing her
furniture out into the yard." Officers met the wife and together returned to her house
and saw the furniture. Swiggett was at a neighbor's house some 20 to 30 feet away.
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attitudes demonstrates that some officers believe outsiders should not
partner conflicts unless serious
interfere with spousal or intimate
25
physical violence is present. 1
Numerous sociological studies have found that a police officer's
concern over his or her own personal safety is another reason he or she
might try to evade domestic violence calls. 126 According to this
research, some law enforcement officers believe that domestic violence
calls are more dangerous than other types of calls for assistance and
often lead to police fatalities. 12 7 This belief is predicated on the fact
12 8
that domestic encounters are often heated and unpredictable.
However, compared to the frequency with which police officers deal
with these altercations, it has not been proven that domestic violence
incidents are more dangerous to the officers who respond than other
police duties. 129 In fact, one study reports that statistics regarding
injuries and deaths resulting from domestic disturbances have been
overstated by nearly three times the real rate of injury. 13 0 Despite the
reality of the degree of danger domestic violence calls pose to police
officers, fear of injury remains a persistent perception that reinforces
131
their reluctance to respond.

When the police officers spoke with him, they smelled alcohol on his breath. Swiggett
denied moving the furniture, and no one actually saw him doing it. The officers warned
Swiggett that they believed his wife, and would arrest him if they had to come back.
Less than two hours later the same officers were sent back to find him. They found
Swiggett "covered in blood and his pocket contained a copy of the same order of
protection which the officers had seen earlier." He had stabbed his wife to death.
Id.
125. See SHERMAN, supra note 15, at 29 (noting that many police officers feel that in the
absence of physical injury, no law has been broken during the domestic disturbance and thus are
reluctant to intervene); MARTIN, supra note 47, at 94 (reporting that police avoid interfering with
"domestic squabbles" because they do not want to make the abuser more aggressive and angry).
126. See DAWSON, supra note 64, at 5 (outlining the various social science studies that have
been conducted regarding police perception of the dangerousness of domestic violence callas and
explaining this belief to be mistaken and erroneously spread in training and through department
"folklore").
127. SHERMAN, supra note 15, at 30. For instance, the training materials provided by some
law enforcement agencies and departments encourage officers to take special precautions, such as
responding to the scene as a pair, in order to avoid dangerous altercations. Id. See also
HANDBOOK, supra note 110, at 15-16 (advising responding officers as to how to deal with
victims of domestic violence to avoid personal danger).
128. SHERMAN, supra note 15, at 30.
129. Zorza, supra note 17, at 52 ("[T]he reality, however, is that domestic disturbance
incidents, which account for thirty percent of police calls, account for only 5.7% of police deaths,
making domestic disturbances one of the least dangerous of all police activities.").
130. CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 30-31 (outlining a 1986 study by Garner and
Clemmer which found flaws in the methodology employed by the FBI in compiling statistics
about officer injury and death while in the line of duty).
13 1. Id. (stating that innovations in police responses have been discouraged because of the
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Finally, some advocacy groups assert that police officers, along with
other members of the criminal justice system, grow frustrated with
domestic violence calls because they see responding as a futile
exercise. 132 Frequently, after calming down the parties involved in a
domestic disturbance, the victim does not want to press charges; she
simply wants the officer to neutralize the situation and give a warning to
her abuser. 133 Even when the abuser is prosecuted, the victim, who may
be the only witness, might refuse to cooperate. 134 The fact that arrested
abusers are seldom convicted, some suggest, adds to police reluctance
135
to prioritize these kinds of calls.
C. The Evolution of Governmental Immunity in Illinois
In order to understand the immunity provided to law enforcement
agents in the IDVA, it is important to examine the evolution of
municipal immunity in Illinois. 136 Prior to the Illinois Supreme Court's
1962 decision in Molitar v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302,
governmental bodies and their employees enjoyed sovereign immunity,
meaning that these entities could not be held civilly liable for actions
undertaken within their governmental roles. 137 Less than a decade later,
the Illinois legislature codified the judicial decision to abolish sovereign
immunity when it adopted the 1970 Illinois Constitution.1 3 8 A similar
yet distinct judicially-recognized immunity also developed within the

questionable belief that domestic violence disturbances are more dangerous than other types of
police calls).
132. RICHARD DAVIS, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: FACTS AND FALLACIES 79 (1998) (calling the
interaction between an abusive relationship and law enforcement personnel as a "'sad slow
dance."); SHERMAN, supra note 15, at 31-32. See also ACHIEVING ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note
82, at 3 (describing the pessimism that criminal justice personnel encounter when trying to
intervene in situations of domestic violence).
133. Waits, supra note 66, at 306-07; ACHIEVING ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 82, at 3
(describing how inaction becomes the customary response by law enforcement officials because
domestic violence victims are "uncooperative" and often do not follow through with criminal
sanctions against their abusers).
134. CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 29-31.
135. See DAVIS, supra note 132, at 71, 73 (explaining that most police officers doubt that their
actions will resolve the problem and stating that "arrest is difficult, if not impossible to justify
[for police officers] if there is relatively poor chance of conviction.").
136. Compare infra Part ll.C (outlining the evolution of governmental immunity in Illinois),
with infra Part III (discussing the explicit limitation on immunity for police officers and
departments when dealing with domestic violence altercations).
137. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 182 N.E.2d 145 (Ill. 1962);
Catherine Voigt, The Death of the Special Duty Exception to Statutory Governmental Immunity,
86 ILL. B.J. 372, 372 (1998).
138. Voigt, supra note 137, at 372.
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common law, known as the public duty doctrine. 139 This doctrine stood
for the proposition that municipalities, law enforcement agencies, and
140
their employees had a duty to protect the public and enforce the law;
however, this broad obligation did not translate into any duty to
particular individuals. 14 1 The public duty doctrine protected officers
liability where they had not
and other governmental entities from civil142
already been afforded immunity by statute.
Over time, an exception to the public duty doctrine emerged. 14 3 The
exception held that the doctrine would not apply to instances in which
the governmental actor had a special relationship with the individual
seeking to sue for breach of duty. 144 A four-part test developed in

Illinois jurisprudence to determine whether a special relationship

139. See, e.g., Schaffrath v. Viii. of Buffalo Grove, 513 N.E.2d 1026, 1027-28 (Ill. App. CL
1987), stating:
[Glenerally, law enforcement officials have no duty to protect individual citizens from
criminal acts. Their responsibility is to the general public. The duty of the police to
preserve the well-being of the community is owed to the public at large rather than to
specific members of the community. This rule rests upon public policy considerations
that a police department's negligence, oversights, blunders or omissions are not the
proximate or legal cause of harms committed by others. A general duty would put the
police in the position of guaranteeing the personal safety of every member of the
community.
Id. See generally Porter v. City of Urbana, 410 N.E.2d 610, 612 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (holding that
the duty of law enforcement officers to preserve a community's well-being generally is owed not
to specific individuals but rather to the community as a whole); Huey v. Town of Cicero, 243
N.E.2d 214, 216 (111.1968) (defining the general rule of law that a municipality is not liable for
its failure to provide police protection); Santy v. Bresee, 473 N.E.2d 69, 72 (11. App. Ct. 1984)
(finding it inappropriate to hold police officers liable for a breach of a duty to the public). See
also Voigt, supra note 137, at 373 (describing the development of the common law public duty
doctrine in Illinois).
140. Leone v. City of Chicago, 619 N.E.2d 119, 121 (Ill. 1993) (including fire fighters and
police officers as those municipal employees covered by the public duty doctrine). See also
Huey, 243 N.E.2d at 216 (affirming the public duty doctrine "in the face of [previous] decisions
holding municipalities liable for affirmative negligent or wilful acts by their employees."); Kerry
A. Bute, When Should MunicipalitiesBe Held Liable for Injuries Negligently Caused by Illinois
Police Officers?, 17 DCBA BRIEF 30, 30 (Apr., 2005) ("[T]he rule protects municipalities from
liability in tort by establishing the principle that police officers have no enforceable duty to
protect individual citizens from harm.").
141. See Bute, supra note 140, at 30 (discussing how the police do not have a duty to protect
individual citizens).
142. Id.
143. Voigt, supra note 137, at 373; Bute, supra note 140, at 30-31.
144. Burdinie v. Vill. of Glendale Heights, 565 N.E.2d 654, 658 (Ill. 1990) (explaining that
special duty arises in two instances, "when the municipality acts in a private instead of a
governmental capacity.., or when it develops a 'relationship' to an individual"). See also Voigt,
supra note 137, at 373 (describing the evolution of the special relationship doctrine as an
exception to the public duty rule).

2007]

Punishing the Protectors

existed in any given case. 14 5 First, the court looked to whether the
14 6
municipality had knowledge of a particular danger to the individual.
Next, it assessed whether there were specific acts or omissions on the
part of the government entity, and then, the court evaluated whether the
acts or omissions were affirmative and willful. 147 Finally, the test
while
required that the injury to the plaintiff must have been sustained
14 8
he or she was under the direct control of the governmental actor.

Although the judiciary moved to eliminate sovereign immunity in
Molitar, three years after that decision, the legislature created statutory

immunity for governmental actors through the Illinois Tort Immunity
Act (ITIA) of 1965.149 The ITIA provided similar protection to the
common law doctrine prior to Molitar.150 However, the ITIA allowed

for liability of protected parties, such as police officers, for their willful
1994) (listing the required elements). See
145. Doe v. Calumet City, 641 N.E.2d 498, 504 (Ill.
also Burdinie, 565 N.E.2d at 658-59 (outlining what is required for a special relationship to be
created); Voigt, supra note 137, at 373 (paraphrasing the test for determining whether a special
duty exists).
146. Doe, 641 N.E.2d at 504.
147. Id.
148. Id. (interpreting the control element to require that "the public employee initiates the
circumstances which create the dangerous situation.").
149. Burdinie, 565 N.E.2d at 658 (describing in detail the various forms of immunity provided
by the ITIA):
For example, a local public entity is not liable for adopting or failing to adopt a
particular enactment or for failing to enforce any law. There is no municipal liability
for negligence connected with the administration of permits, licenses, certificates, and
other authorizations, for negligence connected with the inspection of property for
health or safety hazards, for negligence connected with injuries resulting from unsafe
conditions of municipal property if the local government entity had no actual or
constructive notice of the unreasonably unsafe condition, for negligence resulting in
injuries occurring on public property intended for recreational purposes, unless the
local public entity is guilty of willful and wanton conduct, for the negligent failure to
supervise an activity on public property, or for negligence resulting in injuries incurred
during participation in hazardous recreational activity.
Id. Voigt, supra note 137, at 373.
150. Illinois Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/2-204 (2004), stating "[e]xcept as
otherwise provided by statute, a public employee, as such and acting within the scope of his
employment, is not liable for an injury caused by the act or omission of another person"; 745 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 10/2-109 (2004), "[a] local public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an
act or omission of its employee where the employee is not liable"; 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/4102 (2004):
Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for failure to establish a
police department or otherwise provide police protection service or, if police protection
service is provided, for failure to provide adequate police protection or service, failure
to prevent the commission of crimes, failure to detect or solve crimes, and failure to
identify or apprehend criminals. This immunity is not waived by a contract for private
security service, but cannot be transferred to any non-public entity or employee.
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and wanton conduct. 15 1 The ITIA defined such behavior as "a course of
action which shows an actual or deliberate intention to cause harm, or

which, if not intent, shows utter indifference to or conscious disregard

for the safety of others or their property." 152 The legislature created this
legal protection in part to shield state budgets from depletion by costly
damage awards from tort cases. 153 Illinois courts eventually expanded
the special relationship exception to serve as an exception to statutory
immunity. 15 4 Thus, immunity granted under the ITIA was not absolute
if the plaintiff could establish the requirements of the special
155
relationship test.

Despite the statutory grant of governmental immunity provided by
the ITIA, in 1970, the state legislature codified the Molitar decision by
abolishing the broad common law concept of sovereign immunity when
it adopted a new constitution. 15 6 Immunity for municipal entities from
suit, from that point on, could only be provided by statute where "the
General Assembly may provide by law." 15 7 The language of the 1970
Constitution left the immunity afforded by the ITIA intact. 158 For a
time, Illinois courts also continued to apply the special relationship
exception to the ITIA. 159 However, in 1998, the Illinois Supreme Court
held that the application of this exception to statutory immunity was
151. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/2-210 (2004).
152. Id.
153. Van Meter v. Darien Park District, 799 N.E.2d 273, 279 (111. 2003) (describing the
legislative intent behind the ITIA); Bubb v. Springfield Sch. Dist. 186, 657 N.E.2d 887, 891 (Ill.
1995) (holding that "[b]y providing immunity, the legislature sought to prevent the diversion of
public funds from their intended purpose to the payment of damage claims"). See also Davis v.
Chicago Hous. Auth., 555 N.E.2d 343, 345-46 (111.1990) (citing 18 MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. §
53.24 (1963)):
The reason [for tort immunity of local government entities] is one of public policy, to
protect public funds and public property. Taxes are raised for certain specific
governmental purposes; and, if they could be diverted to the payment of the damage
claims, the more important work of government, which every municipality must
perform regardless of its other relations, would be seriously impaired if not totally
destroyed. The reason for the exemption is sound and unobjectionable.
Id. See also Comments, Illinois Tort Claims Act: A New Approach to Municipal Tort Immunity in
Illinois, 61 NW. U. L. REv. 265, 276 (1966) (suggesting various justifications for granting
immunity to municipal entities); Bute, supra note 140, at 30.
154. Doe v. Calumet City, 641 N.E.2d 498, 504 (Ill. 1994) (explaining that the special
relationship doctrine applied to both common law and statutory immunity).
155. Id.
156. ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 4. See generally Barnett v. Zion Park Dist., 665 N.E.2d 808,
812 (111.1996) (providing a brief history of governmental immunity in Illinois).
157. ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 4.
158. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1-101 et seq (2004).
159. See, e.g., Schaffrath v. Vill. of Buffalo Grove, 513 N.E.2d 1026 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987);
Fryman v. JMK/Skewer, Inc., 484 N.E.2d 909 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
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unconstitutional. 160 The Court found that it was beyond the power of
the courts to apply a judicially-created exception to statutory immunity
when the 1970 constitution gave the legislature exclusive power to
16 1
create, expand, and limit immunity.

The concept of municipal immunity in Illinois has undergone many
changes. 162 However, despite the prevalence of domestic violence as a
large societal problem with which the police frequently interact, prior to
the enactment of the IDVA, the legislature had not specifically
addressed police liability in situations of domestic violence. 163 It was

not until the IDVA was enacted in 1986 that immunity for police
officers and departments was explicitly limited in situations of domestic

violence. 164
160. Harinek v. 161 Clark Street Ltd. P'ship, 692 N.E.2d 1177, 1183 (Ill. 1998), stating:
[W]hen a court finds, on the facts of a particular case, that the General Assembly has
granted a public entity immunity from liability, the court may not then negate that
statutory immunity by applying a common law exception to a common law rule. Doing
so would violate not only the Illinois Constitution's provision governing sovereign
immunity, but also the Constitution's separation of powers clause, which provides that
no branch of government "shall exercise powers properly belonging to another"
(quoting ILL. CONST. art. 11, § 1).
Id.
161. See Harinek, 692 N.E.2d at 1183-84 (holding that the special relationship doctrine could
not overcome immunity granted by the Tort Immunity Act); see also Zimmerman v. Vill. of
Skokie, 697 N.E.2d 699, 702 (111. 1998) (affirming the holding in Harinek). The Harinek
decision did not entirely eliminate the public duty doctrine and its special relationship exception.
See Calloway v. Kinkelaar, 659 N.E.2d 1322, 1336 (111.1995) (Freeman, J., concurring) (stating
that the special relationship exception is still valid "in determining the existence of a legal duty in
a negligence action not precluded by a statutory immunity"). Other jurisdictions that have
abolished sovereign immunity have invalidated the public duty doctrine because they consider it
to be another form of sovereign immunity. See generally Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241
(Alaska 1976), superseded by statute, ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.070, as recognized in Wilson v.
Anchorage, 669 P.2d 569 (Alaska 1983) (finding that the public duty doctrine is a form of
sovereign immunity which is an issue better suited to the legislature); Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d
152, 158-59 (Colo. 1986) (describing extensively the status of the public duty doctrine in various
jurisdictions and outlining the criticisms of the rule); Adam v. State, 380 N.W.2d 716, 724 (Iowa
1986) (calling the public duty doctrine a form of sovereign immunity which is "not to be
amplified by court created doctrine"); Schear v. County Comm'rs, 687 P.2d 728, 730-31 (N.M.
1984) (noting that the public duty doctrine and the concept of sovereign immunity are too closely
linked); DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 653 (Wyo. 1986) (explaining that sovereign immunity
was abolished and that "[t]he public duty only rule, if it ever was recognized in Wyoming, is no
longer viable"); Hudson v. Town of E. Montpelier, 638 A.2d 561, 566 (Vt. 1993) (declining to
adopt the public duty doctrine which the court found to be disfavored by most courts considering
it).
162. See supra Part Il.C (outlining the evolution of governmental immunity in Illinois from
the abolition of sovereign immunity to the application of the special relationship exception).
163. See supra Parts II.A, B and C (discussing the frequency of domestic violence, the
important role of police and the general rules of law regarding governmental immunity).
164. See infra Part III (describing the language of Section 305 of the IDVA and the way in
which courts in Illinois have interpreted it).
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III. DISCUSSION
Beyond the general statutory and common law immunity granted to
governmental bodies, Illinois law specifically addresses the need to both
provide and limit immunity for law enforcement bodies and
municipalities in the context of domestic violence. 165 This Part outlines
the purpose of, and remedies provided by, the IDVA, one of the
principal laws of the state governing the treatment of domestic
violence. 16 6 This Part also discusses Calloway v. Kinkelaar, the first
case in which the Illinois Supreme Court recognized a cause of action
that allows victims of domestic violence to recover against police
officers whose willful and wanton conduct was the proximate cause of
their injury. 16 7 Finally, this Part reviews the Court's most recent
discussion of the issue of police immunity in which it explained the
1 68
interaction of the IDVA and the ITIA.

A. The Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986
The IDVA in its comprehensive modem form was adopted in
1986.169 A previous version of the statute had existed since 1982, but
was heavily revised to create the law in its current form. 170 Aside from
certain sections of the criminal code, it is the principal law in Illinois
17 1
addressing domestic violence.
The IDVA is divided into four articles. 172 The first article provides
definitions of important terms used in the IDVA. 173 Words such as
"abuse" and "harassment" are intricately spelled out and detailed
examples of such behavior are provided. 174 For instance, the term
165. See infra Part III (outlining statutory provisions and case law in which Illinois has
discussed immunity for police officers, police departments, and municipalities in the context of
intimate partner abuse).
166. See infra Part III.A (describing in detail the purpose of the IDVA, the class of individuals
protected by it, and the remedies it provides).
167. See infra Part III.B. 1 (discussing the Court's reasoning and the cause of action created in
the Calloway decision).
168. See infra Part III.B.2 (examining the line of cases stemming from Calloway and
examining the way in which recent decisions have affirmed and expanded on the Calloway
decision).
169. Sheila Simon, Survey of Illinois Law: Family Law-The Illinois Domestic Violence Act,
27 S. ILL. L.J. 719, 720 (2003) (explaining the legislative history and composition of the IDVA).
170. Illinois Domestic Violence Act, Pub. L. No. 82-0621, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
SYNOPSIS & DIGEST, H.B. 0366 at 922 (1982); Simon, supra note 169, at 720.
171. Simon, supra note 169, at 720.
172. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/1, et. seq. (2004).
173. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103 (2004).
174. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103(1) & (7) (2004) (defining abuse as "physical abuse,
harassment, intimidation of a dependent, interference with personal liberty or willful deprivation

2007]

Punishing the Protectors

"harassment" includes certain stalking behaviors and threats of child

abduction. 175 The first article also issues an extensive purpose
statement that presents domestic violence as a grave societal concern,
which has historically been ineffectively addressed. 17 6 The authors of
the IDVA intended to support victims of domestic violence by
providing them with greater remedies. 177 The purpose statement also

explains how the IDVA was intended to clarify the role of law
178
enforcement departments and officers in handling domestic violence.
Courts have relied upon this purpose statement as a critical piece in
provisions of the IDVA,
understanding and applying the various
17 9
provision.
immunity
the
specifically

but does not include reasonable direction of a minor child by a parent or person in loco parentis";
also listing six different kinds of conduct as harassment which will be presumed to cause
emotional distress). The broad definitions of such terms included in the IDVA are particularly
important to protect victims of domestic violence. See CATHY HOOG, WASH. ST. COAL. AGAINST
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ENOUGH AND YET NOT ENOUGH: AN EDUCATIONAL RESOURCE MANUAL
ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ADVOCACY FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES IN WASHINGTON STATE
14-16 (2001), http://www.mincava.umn.edu/documents/wscdv/wscdv.pdf (describing the various
forms of domestic violence perpetrated on members of the disabled community and describing
additional obstacles disabled victims face such as mobility impairment, discrimination and
untrained service providers). For instance, disabled victims of domestic violence may suffer
abuse when their nutritional, medical or physical needs are ignored. Id. While this conduct is not
the traditional form of abuse, it still qualifies as abuse under the IDVA. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
60/103(1) & (7) (2004)
175. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/103(7)(i)-(vi) (2004).
176. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/102 (2004). Specifically:
[T]he Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes,
which are to: (1) recognize domestic violence as a serious crime against the individual
and society which produces family disharmony in thousands of Illinois families,
promotes a pattern of escalating violence which frequently culminates in intra-family
homicide, and creates an emotional atmosphere; ...
(3) recognize that the legal system has ineffectively dealt with family violence in the
past, allowing abusers to escape effective prosecution or financial liability, and has not
adequately acknowledged the criminal nature of domestic violence; that, although
many laws have changed, in practice there is still widespread failure to appropriately
protect and assist victims; ...
Id.
177. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/102(4) (2004) (explaining that support must take the form of
diligent enforcement of domestic violence criminal and civil laws and reduction of the abuser's
access to the victim).
178. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/102(5) (2004).
179. See infra Part III.B (describing how courts in Illinois have determined the meaning of
Section 305 of the IDVA). See also Calloway v. Kinkelaar, 659 N.E.2d 1322, 1326-28 (Ill.
1995) (discussing at length the IDVA and the legislative intent behind its creation); Moore v.
Green, 848 N.E.2d 1015, 1023-24 (Ill. 2006) (relying on the interpretation of the IDVA in
Calloway).
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The second article defines the class of individuals who are protected
by the IDVA, 18 0 and thoroughly lays out the remedies and support
services provided to protected parties. 18 1 Protected individuals include

any person abused by a family or household member, high-risk adults
with disabilities, minor children, and dependent adults in the care of a
The IDVA provides extensive
family or household member. 182
monetary remedies, and the
of
protection,
orders
remedies including
183
The types of orders of
availability of courtroom advocates.
protection provided by the IDVA are numerous and significant.18 4 The
IDVA allows for orders to be tailored to prevent particular kinds of
behavior and to give victims sole possession of the home and/or
exclusive access to personal property. 185 Orders can also deal with
child custody issues and can even require an abuser to seek counseling
services. 186 Further, the IDVA allows certain remedies to be sought by
the victim without notice to the perpetrator, a particularly important
if the abuser has
provision given that domestic violence often escalates
87
knowledge that a victim has obtained an order.'
Article III creates the duties required of law enforcement departments
and officers. 18 8 It requires that agencies develop arrest procedure
180. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/201 (2004).
181. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/202-227.1 (2004).
182. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/201(2004).
183. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/205, 214 (2004). See also David Taylor, Defending the
Indefensible to Further a Later Case: Sanctioning Respondents in Illinois Domestic Violence
Cases, 23 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 403, 405-06 (2003) (listing additional remedies provided by the
IDVA including possession of personal property, payment of support, or prohibition of entry to
the residence while under the influence of drugs or alcohol).
184. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214 (2004) (listing seventeen possible remedies provided by
orders of protection under the IDVA).
185. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214 (2004). This provision states in part:
(1) Prohibition of abuse, neglect, or exploitation. Prohibit respondent's harassment,
interference with personal liberty, intimidation of a dependent, physical abuse, or
willful deprivation, neglect or exploitation ....
(2) Grant of exclusive possession of residence. Prohibit respondent from entering or
remaining in any residence or household of the petitioner, including one owned or
leased by respondent ....
(14.5) ... If the court is satisfied that there is any danger of the illegal use of firearms,
be
it shall issue an order that any firearms in the possession of the respondent,
turned over to the local law enforcement agency for safekeeping.
Id.
186. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214(5)-(8) (2004).
187. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/217(a)(3) (2004) (stating that the victim must show that harm
will likely occur if the abuser is given notice before the remedy is granted); Kinports & Fischer,
supra note 61, at 187 (explaining that a woman whose abuser knows of her attempt to seek
protective relief is at considerably more risk).
188. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/301-06 (2004).
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policies for domestic violence calls and maintain records pertaining to
police response. 189 It also permits an officer to arrest without a warrant
so long as the officer has adequate probable cause to believe that a
crime has been committed. 190 The article also demands that officers
complete reports of calls and lists the types of assistance officers shall
provide to victims. 19 1 Failure to comply with the obligations set out by
Article II1can be the basis of civil suits against the police. 19 2 However,
193
Section 305 limits liability to willful and wanton acts or omissions.
Finally, Article IV of the IDVA briefly discusses the role of health care
19 4
providers in the treatment of victims of domestic violence.
B. Case Law Interpretingthe Immunity Provisionof the IDVA
Despite the strong and clear language of the IDVA, some of its
provisions have required interpretation by the courts. 195 Since the
adoption of the IDVA in 1986, Illinois courts have expanded the range
of relationships covered under the Act to include not only those who are
married or dating, but also same-sex couples and individuals who are
related to their abuser by blood or marriage. 196 Illinois courts have also
been called upon to clarify the types of behavior that qualify as
189. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/301.1, 302 (2004). See also Webster, supra note 18, at 673
(describing the DuPage County Domestic Violence Protocol which was created in order to
comply with Section 301.1 of the IDVA).
190. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/301(a) (2004). Stating:
Any law enforcement officer may make an arrest without warrant if the officer has
probably cause to believe that the person has committed or is committing any crime,
including but not limited to violation of an order of protection ... even if the crime
was not committed in the presence of the officer.
Id.

191. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/303-04 (2004).
192. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/305 (2004). Specifically stating:
Any act of omission or commission by any law enforcement officer acting in good
faith in rendering emergency assistance or otherwise enforcing this Act shall not
impose civil liability upon the law enforcement officer or his or her supervisor or
employer, unless the act is a result of willful or wanton misconduct.
Id.
193.

Id.

194. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/401 (2004) (requiring health care providers to provide victims
of abuse "immediate and adequate information regarding services available to victims of abuse,"
and granting immunity from civil liability for good faith efforts to provide such information).
195. See generally Simon, supra note 169 (discussing in detail the various provisions of the
IDVA that have been reviewed by Illinois courts).
196. 750 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 60/103(6) (2004) (amending the IDVA to include dating couples
as a protected class); Glater v. Fabianich, 625 N.E.2d 96, 99 (111.App. Ct. 1993) (holding that the
IDVA covers same-sex couples who shared a common dwelling for a set period of time);
Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 541 N.E.2d 872, 875 (ll. App. Ct. 1989) (interpreting the IDVA to
cover parent-child relationships).
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The IDVA has survived

constitutional challenges to the extensive powers it bestows upon the
judicial and law enforcement systems at the expense of the rights of
alleged abusers. 19 8 However, it was not until 1995 that the Illinois

Supreme Court considered Section 305, the immunity provision of the
IDVA.199
1. IDVA Created a Cause of Action: Calloway v. Kinkelaar

The Illinois Supreme Court first analyzed the meaning of the IDVA's
law enforcement immunity provision in Calloway v. Kinkelaar.200 The
plaintiff, a domestic violence victim, brought multiple counts against

the sheriff and the county where she lived for willful, wanton and
negligent failure to comply with the IDVA. 20 1 The circuit court
dismissed the complaint citing that the plaintiff failed to plead facts
establishing an exception to the public duty doctrine and, thus, the
sheriff and county were immune from suit.20 2 The appellate court
agreed that the IDVA did not allow the plaintiff to state a claim of
negligence, but reversed the dismissal of the willful and wanton
claim.20 3 The defendants appealed and the Illinois Supreme Court
2 04
agreed to hear the case.

197. People v. Peterson, 783 N.E.2d 1067, 1071-72 (111.App. Ct. 2003) (stalking behaviors
such as repeatedly driving by the victims residence constitute actionable behavior under the
IDVA); People v. Reynolds, 706 N.E.2d 49, 52-54 (ill. App. Ct. 1999) (finding that an indirect
mailing demonstrating criminal intent is harassment); People ex rel. Minteer v. Kozin, 697
N.E.2d 891, 895 (111. App. Ct. 1998) (holding that multiple phone calls were not harassment
unless the plaintiff could demonstrate that such calls would cause a reasonable person distress);
In re the Marriage of Healy, 635 N.E.2d 666, 669-70 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (finding that physical
abuse in the form of sleep deprivation that is not repeated is not harassment); Gasaway v.
Gasaway, 616 N.E.2d 610, 611-13 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (taking a child away from the custodial
parent is harassment); People v. Zarebski, 542 N.E.2d 445, 452 (II1. App. Ct. 1989) (violating a
stay-away order and cursing at guests is harassment).
198. People v. Ramos, 735 N.E.2d 1094, 1094 (ill. App. Ct. 2000) (upholding punishments
outlined under the IDVA for violating a court order); In re the Marriage of Gordon, 599 N.E.2d
1151, 1183 (il. App. Ct. 1992) (declaring invalid an order of protection that was improperly
granted in a plenary hearing); In re the Marriage of Lenhart, 531 N.E.2d 123, 125 (Ill. App. Ct.
1988) (holding that service is required in order for an order of protection to be valid); People v.
Hazelwonder, 485 N.E.2d 1211, 1213 (il. App. Ct. 1985) (ruling that an order of protection may
be extended at a sentencing hearing).
199. Calloway v. Kinkelaar, 659 N.E.2d 1322 (Ill. 1995).
200. Id. at 1324.
201. Id. The plaintiff lived in Effingham County, which is located in the southern part of
Illinois. Id.
202. Calloway v. Kinkelaar, 633 N.E.2d 1380, 1381 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
203. Calloway, 633 N.E.2d at 1383. Placing emphasis on plaintiff's order of protection, the
court held in part:
The Illinois Act singles out those who are victims of domestic violence as persons in
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The plaintiff, Helen Calloway, had suffered mental and physical
abuse at the hands of her husband throughout their marriage. 20 5 In
1991, she was granted an emergency order of protection to prevent her
20 6
husband from entering her home or contacting her at her workplace.
20 7
The order was personally served upon her husband by the sheriff.
Less than a month after the order was put into place, Helen's husband

violated the order of protection by making threatening calls to her at
work.20 8 He threatened her life and warned that he would harm their
child and her father. 20 9 Helen reported the calls and the violation of the
order to the sheriffs department, warning them that her husband was
armed.2 10 In response to her call, the sheriff drove to Helen's home and

briefly assessed the situation from his car before driving away. 211 He
did not conduct any further investigation despite seeing the husband's
car in the driveway. 2 12 A little more than two hours after Helen's call to
the authorities, the husband entered her workplace with a gun, removed
her from the premises, and fled with her as a captive in his car. 2 13 A

need of special protection by law enforcement officials .. . Article IIIof the Act
requires law enforcement officials to act and assist a victim who presents an order of
protection to an officer. Plaintiff herein obtained an order of protection and, thus, was
singled out by the judicial process as a person in need of special protection. The sheriff
had a duty to provide her with such protection.
Id.
204. Calloway, 659 N.E.2d at 1325. Justice McMorrow wrote the decision for the court. Id.
at 1324.
205. Id. at 1324 (explaining that Michael Calloway had threatened to kill Helen and commit
suicide; it was also alleged that he mentally and physically abused his children).
206. Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 6, Calloway v. Kinkelaar, 659 N.E.2d 1322 (Ill. 1994)
(No. 77391), 1994 WL 16179554. The emergency order prohibited Michael Calloway from
engaging in the following conduct:
[(A)] Harassing, physically abusing, or interfering with personal liberty of Plaintiff or
her children; (b) [e]ntering or remaining at the home of Plaintiff's parents; (c)
[e]ntering Plaintiff's place of employment at Garden's Restaurant in Effingham,
Illinois; [or] (d) [m]aking telephone calls to Plaintiff's place of employment.
Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. (describing how Michael Calloway also told Helen to go home and pick up their fiveyear-old daughter and threatened to kill himself in front of the child if she did not comply).
210. Id. at 6-7 (noting that the dispatcher told Helen to call her attorney to seek advice as to
how to proceed).
211. Id.at7.
212. Calloway v.Kinkelaar, 659 N.E.2d 1322, 1328 (Ill.
1995) (stating that even though there
was reason to believe the husband was in the house, the sheriff chose not conduct further
investigation because he did not want to -wake up anyone").
213. Brief of Defendants-Appellants, supra note 206, at 7 (explaining that Helen made her
first call to the authorities at 5:50 a.m. and her husband arrived at 8 a.m.).
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roadblock implemented by the sheriffs department stopped the car 2and
14
the plaintiff escaped, but not before the husband fatally shot himself.
In determining whether the plaintiffs allegations were actionable
under Illinois law, the Court looked closely at the language of the
IDVA.2 15 It examined the purpose of the IDVA and found Sections
102(4) and 102(6) particularly important. 2 16 These provisions specifically called for prompt and diligent enforcement of protective orders to
help curtail domestic violence and sought to establish further civil and
criminal remedies to support victims. 2 17 The Court found that the
plaintiff was clearly a member of the protected class established by the
IDVA. 2 18

It also reviewed the definitions of such critical terms as

harassment and abuse and found that the plaintiff sought to avoid these
types of conduct perpetrated by her husband. 2 19 Finally, the Court
considered the duties of law enforcement officials and reviewed the
immunity provision in Section 305.220
The clear language of the immunity provision, the Court reasoned,
unmistakably granted immunity to officers whose good-faith
performance of their duties resulted in negligence. 22 1 However, the
immunity did not extend to the willful and wanton conduct of the
police. 22 2 The limit on protection from suit for this particular category
of behavior was a necessary balance between the crucial purpose of the
IDVA, to protect and empower domestic violence victims, and the need
223
for police to be free to perform their duties without fear of sanction.
214. Id. at 7-8.
215. Calloway, 659 N.E.2d at 1326-28. See also Kelley Quinn, Panel Stresses Priority of
Domestic Violence Law, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Dec. 29, 2004 (discussing the reasoning of the
Calloway decision).
216. Calloway, 659 N.E.2d at 1326, 1328 (finding that these provisions "reveal the General
Assembly's intent to encourage active intervention on the part of law enforcement officials in
cases of intrafamily abuse").
217. Id. at 1326. See also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/102(4) (2004) (identifying as one of the
purposes of the IDVA as being to "[s]upport the efforts of victims of domestic violence to avoid
further abuse by promptly entering and diligently enforcing court orders which prohibit abuse
and, when necessary, reduce the abuser's access to the victim .... ); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
60/102(6) (2004) (stating that the IDVA is meant to "[e]xpand the civil and criminal remedies for
victims of domestic violence... ").
218. Calloway, 659 N.E.2d at 1326 (holding that Helen was unmistakably a person protected
by the IDVA because she was a "person abused by a family or household member").
219. Id. at 1326-27.
220. Id. at 1327.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Calloway, 659 N.E.2d at 1327.
We believe that this partial immunity of law enforcement agents is a direct expression
of legislative intent to reconcile the strongly worded purposes of the Act-primarily
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Because the statute created duties to be carried out by law enforcement
and specifically sought to extend the form and number of remedies
available to the protected class, by recognizing a cause of action under
the IDVA, the Supreme Court furthered the legislative intent behind the

IDVA.

224

For the first time since the adoption of the IDVA, the Court
recognized a cause of action for victims of domestic violence against
the police stemming from Section 305.225 In order to recover, the
plaintiff must show that he or she is a party protected under the IDVA,
that the duties owed to him or her by the police were breached by
willful or wanton conduct, and that the conduct proximately caused his
or her injuries. 2 26 According to the Court, the plaintiff pled facts
sufficient to meet these requirements and thus she was entitled to sue
the sheriff for his treatment of her case. 22 7 Whether the sheriff breached
his duties under the IDVA by willful and wanton behavior that
proximately caused Calloway's injuries was a question of fact for the
22 8
jury.
While the analysis of the statutory language supported the conclusion
that the legislature intended to limit immunity for law enforcement in
instances of willful and wanton conduct, the Court found no reason to
allow a negligence claim. 229 In fact, the Court held that the IDVA
230
barred recognition of a cause of action based on ordinary negligence.
It interpreted the plain language of Section 305 to provide immunity for
a police officer's mere negligence in good-faith performance of his
the protection of and assistance to victims of abuse-with the recognition that officers
performing their legal duties should not be held civilly liable when their efforts to
enforce the Act fall short, unless the conduct in question can be view as willful and
wanton. (Emphasis in original.)
Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1328 (holding that giving judicial recognition to the right of action would give
effect to the legislature's purpose in enacting the IDVA).
226. Id.; 9 THOMAS P. BOGGESS ET AL., ILL. LAW & PRAC., CITIES, VILLAGES AND OTHER
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 335 (West 2006); Licia A. Esposito Eaton, Annotation, Liability of
Municipality or Other Governmental Unitfor Failureto Provide Police Protection From Crime,
90 A.L.R. 5TH 273, 9[b] (2001).
227. Calloway, 659 N.E.2d at 1329. Helen Calloway was a protected person under the IDVA.
Id. at 1328. The sheriff was aware of the order of protection she had obtained against her
husband and was informed by a dispatcher of the violations of the order, yet he allegedly did not
perform the duties required of him by the IDVA. Id. "The sheriff did not attempt to speak to
Calloway, investigate the situation further, arrest Calloway for violating the order of protection,
or otherwise take reasonable steps to prevent further abuse and harassment." Id. at 1328-29.
228. Id. at 1329.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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duties prescribed by the IDVA.2 3 1 It found that granting immunity for
negligent acts of law enforcement provided the necessary balance
between the purpose of the IDVA and recognition that officers should
not be vulnerable to civil suit when their honest attempts to enforce the
232
IDVA fall short.
Finally, the Court chose not to address the defendant's argument that
the claims should be dismissed because of the common law public duty
doctrine. 2 33 As Justice McMorrow reaffirmed, a statute that expressly
2 34
provides for a limit on liability controls over a common law doctrine.
2. Cause of Action Affirmed: Sneed v. Howell and Moore v. Green
The cause of action created by Calloway has been addressed at the
appellate level only a few times since it was first recognized.2 3 5 In
these cases, both the appellate courts and the Supreme Court itself
affirmed and strengthened the right of domestic violence victims to
bring suit against police officers and departments who mistreat their
cases.

2 36

i. Sneed v. Howell
The Illinois Appellate Court in the Fifth District affirmed Calloway
when it ruled that the executor of a domestic violence victim's estate
stated a claim under the IDVA against the city because the police had
failed to perform their statutory duties. 237 In Sneed v. Howell, the
decedent and her abuser had been married for three years.23 8 The
victim attempted to end the violent relationship by divorce, but the
abuse continued beyond the dissolution. 239 Two years after the
marriage ended, the victim received an order of protection against her

231. Calloway, 659 N.E.2d at 1327, 1329 (dismissing the negligence claims and concluding
that "[our] analysis of the statutory language and intent of section 305 of the Act supports the
conclusion that the legislature unambiguously intended to limit the liability of law enforcement
personnel to willful and wanton acts or omissions in enforcing the Act").
232. Id. at 1327.
233. Id. at 1329-30 (calling the defendant's contention legally irrelevant because Helen's
complaint was based on provisions of the IDVA as opposed to common law duty).
234. Id.
235. Sneed v. Howell, 716 N.E.2d 336 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); Moore v. Green, 848 N.E.2d 1015
(Il. 2006).
236. Id.
237. Sneed, 716 N.E.2d at 344.
238. Id. at 338.
239. Id. The couple divorced on August 29, 1996, and the incident that led to this suit
occurred on July 5, 1996. Id. See also supra Part I.A (describing the rate of recidivism in

abusive relationships).
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ex-husband. 240 In the days leading up to her death, the victim reported
to the police that her ex-husband had been stalking her at work and had
slashed the tires of her car. 24 1 The police took no action in response to
these complaints. 242 The ex-husband's abuse culminated on the day he
confronted the victim, forced her into her car, and fatally shot her in the
2 43
chest.
The appellate court emulated the reasoning employed by the Supreme
Court in Calloway in determining whether the victim had pled sufficient
facts to state a claim against the police for their response to the domestic
violence altercation.244 It determined that the decedent qualified as a
protected person under the IDVA. 24 5 It also found that the abuser's
conduct of slashing the victim's tires, abducting her, and inflicting her
terminal wounds constituted abuse and harassment as defined by the
statute. 24 6 Unlike the Supreme Court, which did not define willful and
wanton conduct, the appellate court cited Illinois precedent describing
actionable conduct as "a course of action which shows an actual or
an
deliberate intention to cause harm or which, if not intentional, shows 247
utter indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others."
Because the police knew of the pattern of abuse suffered by the victim,
yet failed to perform the duties affirmatively created for them by Article
III of the IDVA, the court found that the complaint satisfactorily pled
the elements of the cause of action recognized in Calloway.24 8 The
court also affirmed the dismissal of similar counts against the State's
Attorney for failure to state a claim because the duties established by
the IDVA were imposed solely on police departments and personnel.24 9
Actions taken by the State's Attorney were therefore covered by the

240. Sneed, 716 N.E.2d at 338.
241. Id. at 338-39.
242. Id. at 344.
243. Id. at 338-39.
244. Compare Sneed, 716 N.E.2d at 343-44 (analyzing the articles of the IDVA and applying
them to the case), with supra Part III.B.1 (describing the reasoning employed by the Illinois
Supreme Court in Calloway). See also Quinn, supra note 215 (discussing reasoning of Calloway
decision).
245. Sneed, 716 N.E.2d at 343.
246. Id. at 344.
247. Id. at 343 (quoting Burke v. 12 Rothschild's Liquor Mart, Inc., 593 N.W.2d 522, 532
(1992)). In Calloway, the Court acknowledged the difficulty of determining what constitutes
willful and wanton conduct, yet refused to outline specific parameters. Calloway v. Kinkelaar,
659 N.E.2d 1322, 1327 (111.1995). The Court stated, "Although the line between willful and
wanton misconduct and simple negligence may be difficult to draw in some circumstances, it is
hardly a new issue to the courts of this State." Id.
248. Sneed, 716 N.E.2d at 344.
249. Id. at 339.
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immunity granted by the ITIA.25 0 The right of action created by the
IDVA covered only the misconduct of police officers and agencies and
for victims against other categories of
did not provide a remedy
25 1
municipal employees.
ii. Moore v. Green

The Supreme Court of Illinois found it necessary to revisit Section
305 of the IDVA in the case described at the beginning of this
Comment, Moore v. Green.25 2 In Moore, the city and police, as
defendants, argued that certain sections of the ITIA provided them with
immunity from claims arising out of White's death.2 5 3 In Calloway, the

Court rejected the defendants' argument that the common law immunity
not yet clearly decided how the
doctrine granted immunity, but it had
254
IDVA and the ITIA should interact.
The defendants in Moore relied on Sections 4-102 and 4-107 of the
ITIA as the bases of their motion to dismiss the claims. 2 55 The Court
256
recognized that both sections were applicable to White's case.

Section 4-102 provides absolute immunity for failing to provide police
services, and Section 4-107 grants absolute immunity for failing to
make an arrest. 25 7 The Court found, however, that Section 305 of the
IDVA was also relevant. 258 The Court employed Illinois rules of
250. Id. at 340-41 (determining first that based on the test from Healy v. Vaupel, 549 N.E.2d
1240, 1246 (111.1990), the State's Attorney was a municipal employee, and, second, that he was
acting within reasonable boundaries of his employment when he failed to act on the husband's
violations of the order of protection).
251. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/305 (2004). See also Calloway, 659 N.E.2d at 1327 (quoting
provisions limiting the scope of the IDVA to law enforcement officers).
252. See supra Part I (illustrating the facts of Moore).
253. Moore v. Green, 848 N.E.2d 1015, 1018 (I11.2006). The defendants argued that the ITIA
provided them absolute immunity for failing to make an arrest and thus, Moore's claims should
be barred. Id.
254. Calloway, 659 N.E.2d at 1329-30.
255. Moore, 848 N.E.2d at 1018.
256. Id. at 1020.
257. Id. (noting that in the typical case that is not based on domestic violence, these provisions
would provide absolute immunity and bar claims against the police). Section 4-102 provides in
part:
Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for failure to establish a
police department or otherwise provide police protection service or, if police protection
service is provided, for failure to provide adequate police protection or service, failure
to prevent the commission of crimes, failure to detect or solve crimes, and failure to
identify or apprehend criminals.
745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/4-102 (2004). Similarly, Section 4-107 states, "[n]either a local public
entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury caused by the failure to make an arrest ...
745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/4-107 (2004).
258. Moore, 848 N.E.2d at 1020.
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statutory construction, and because it was unable to comply with the
plain language of both statutes, considered the legislative intent behind
2 59
the competing statutes in order to determine which law governed.
Relying heavily on the language of the IDVA, and the Calloway
decision it had handed down a decade before, the Court again explored
the meaning and purpose of the IDVA. 2 60

The Court reiterated its

previous finding that the legislature enacted the IDVA to protect and
support victims of domestic violence and to encourage active
intervention on the part of police officers and officials. 26 1 It found that
the immunity provision, Section 305, operated in conjunction with
Section 304, which outlined law enforcement duties, to discourage the
breach of those duties. 2 62 Partial immunity granted by the IDVA
constituted a direct expression of the legislature's intent to rectify the
past shortcomings of law enforcement in dealing with victims of
domestic violence. 26 3 To grant absolute immunity under the ITIA, an
older and more general statute, would defeat the purpose of the IDVA to
encourage proper police conduct and sanction inadequate police
response.

2 64

The Court found it legally irrelevant that claims based on domestic
violence were not included in the specific language of the ITIA, which
exempted other types of claims. 265 The Court held that the legislature
meant to burden law enforcement officials and officers in domestic
259. Id. at 1020-21.
260. Id. at 1021-24 (mirroring the reasoning of Calloway while also acknowledging that
"Calloway did not address the issue here: whether sections 4-102 and 4-107 of the Tort Immunity
Act insulate [the defendants] from such liability").
261. Id. at 1026. Stating:
The structure of that Act reflects a comprehensive statutory scheme for reform of the
Most
.
legal system's historically inadequate response to domestic violence
importantly for this case, it details the responsibilities of law enforcement officers. As
we noted in Calloway, "[tihese provisions reveal the General Assembly's intent to
encourage active intervention on the part of law enforcement officials in cases of
intrafamily abuse."
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
262. Id.
263. Moore, 848 N.E.2d at 1026.
264. Id. at 1027. Reasoning:
Just as the legislature exercised its constitutional prerogative to provide immunity in
the Tort Immunity Act, it did so in the Domestic Violence Act as well. The
legislature's intent in this regard is inconsistent with absolute immunity for
municipalities under section 4-102 and 4-107 of the Tort Immunity Act.
Id.
265. Id. at 1019 (noting that the ITIA does not provide an exhaustive list of exemptions and
quoting the appellate court decision that held that "the strongly worded language of the legislature
in enacting the Domestic Violence Act cannot be ignored").
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violence cases with the risk of civil liability should they fail to carry out
for the
Moore clearly stands
their duties under the IDVA.26 6
267
proposition that Section 305 of the IDVA trumps the ITIA.
Based on the language of Section 305 of the IDVA, victims of
domestic violence in Illinois have been granted the legal ability to bring

suit against police departments and officers that act in a willful and

wanton manner in responding to domestic violence calls. 268 The rulings
of the Illinois courts affirm the cause of action and make it an effective
tool to recover from those who are in a position to protect but fail to do
so.

2 69

IV.

ANALYSIS

The cause of action created by the IDVA is a strong legal remedy for
victims of domestic violence who also have suffered from police
misconduct. 2 70 It greatly surpasses the legal relief provided to victims
in other states in terms of the protections it provides to victims and the
incentives it creates for police to adequately respond to domestic
violence calls. 27 1 This Part first outlines the state tort remedies
available to victims of domestic violence in three other states, 27 2 and the
273
remedies available to victims that differ than remedies in Illinois.
The State of Washington was selected for comparison because it is one

266. Id. at 1026-27. The court states that to find absolute immunity for the defendants would
be problematic:
It would pervert the broad purposes of the Domestic Violence Act .... [W]e need look
no farther than the language of the Domestic Violence Act to divine [its] intent. The
structure of that Act reflects a comprehensive statutory scheme for reform of the legal
system's historically inadequate response to domestic violence
. This partial
immunity is a direct expression of legislative intent.
Id. at 1026.
267. Moore, 848 N.E.2d at 1027. See also Roger Huebner & Jerry Zarley, Tort Immunity:
Adequate Police Service, 85 ILL. MUN. REV. 19, No. 6 (2006) (analyzing the impact of the Moore
ruling by the Illinois Supreme Court).
268. See supra Part III.A (stating the language of Section 305 of the IDVA and explaining its
impact).
269. See supra Part IHl.B (explaining the interpretation of Section 305 by courts in Illinois).
270. See supra Part 1II.B (discussing the case law that recognized and strengthened the right
of action for victims of domestic violence in Illinois).
271. See infra Part IV.B (outlining the ways in which the cause of action in Illinois is more
beneficial to victims than the remedies provided in other states).
272. See infra Part IV.A (examining the status of police immunity in situations of domestic
violence in Washington, California, and New York, and outlining the requirements for a victim to
bring suit against law enforcement and municipalities).
273. Compare infra Part IV.A (describing the statutory framework of Washington, California,
and New York), with supra Part III (discussing the statutory and common law treatment of
domestic violence in Illinois).
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of sixteen states to have addressed the problem of domestic violence by
enacting a mandatory arrest law. Thus, discussion of the right of action

for victims in that state is representative of a large majority of other
jurisdictions with similar statutory schemes. 274 California and New
York were chosen for analysis because both states are widely
recognized as legal trend-setters, and jurisprudence in those states is
often later followed by other jurisdictions. 27 5 Therefore, understanding
the ability of victims to recover for law enforcement misconduct in
California and New York might serve as an indicator of how other state
laws will evolve. 2 76 Next, this Part compares Washington, California
and New York to Illinois and highlights the strengths of the Illinois
cause of action under the IDVA to demonstrate how it provides more
protections for victims of domestic violence than are available in other
jurisdictions. 277 Finally, this Part discusses the weaknesses of the
Illinois law that continue to leave victims of domestic violence
27 8
vulnerable to insufficient police protection.
A. Remedies Providedby Other States
While
regarding
approach
domestic

most other states have enacted comprehensive legislation
domestic violence, each jurisdiction has taken a different
to limiting law enforcement immunity in situations of
violence and choosing what remedies to make available to

274. See Rizer, supra note 45, at 9 n.54 (listing the states which, as of 2005, had enacted
mandatory arrest laws, including Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Iowa,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
Washington and West Virginia).
275. See Jonathan J. Cordone, Protecting or Handicapping Connecticut's Children: State v.
Miranda, 32 CONN. L. REv. 329, 332 (1999) (reporting that New York leads legal trends in other
areas of the law); Marsha Garrison, Marriage:The Status of Contract, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 1039,
1060 n.110 (1983) (recognizing California as a legal trend-setter); Rosann Torres, Article 81 of
The Mental Hygiene Law: Designed to Protect the Elderly, But Prejudicing Children's Rights, 7
J.L. & POL'Y 303, 339 (1998) (acknowledging New York courts trend toward judicial activism);
William Walsh, Smith v. Regents of the University of California: The Marketplace is Closed, 21
J.C. & U.L. 405,406 (1994) (stating that California courts are often hailed as legal pioneers).
276. See Julia Hayward Biggs, No Drip, No Flush, No Growth: How Cities Can Control
Growth Beyond Their Boundariesby Refusing to Extend Utility Services, 22 URB. LAW. 285, 285
");
(1990) ("California, almost always a legal trend-setter, once again has set the pace
Heather L. Milligan, The Influence of Religion and Morality Legislation on the Interpretation of
Second-Parent Adoption Statutes: Are the California Courts Establishing a Religion?, 39 CAL.
W. L. REv. 137, 161 (2002) ("Other states look to California to set the legal trend."); Barbara S.
Fishleder, Why Tempt Fate?, 54 OR. ST. B. BULL. 33, 33 (May 1994) ("Since New York's legal
trends are often followed by other jurisdictions, [its] position may be taken by other states.").
277. See infra Part IV.B (comparing Illinois law to law of Washington, California, and New
York and emphasizing the relative benefits of Illinois law).
278. See infra Part IV.C (reporting the flaws of the current status of Illinois law).
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victims of intimate partner abuse. 27 9 Although these approaches may be
innovative, most still pose severe challenges for the victims they
serve. 2 80 For example, Washington uses a mandatory arrest law that
imposes a limited duty on the police. 2 8 1 The cause of action in
California utilizes the special relationship exception, creating obstacles
for victims seeking to file suit against the police, 282 while the remedy
available to victims in New York leaves those victims who have not
obtained an order of protection vulnerable to police misconduct.2 8 3
1. Washington
The State of
has enacted a domestic violence statute
specifically to address the problem of intimate partner abuse and the
under-enforcement of criminal laws prohibiting such violence. 2 85 The
statute does not create new laws pertaining to domestic violence, but
aims to encourage law enforcement personnel to enforce existing
sanctions consistently in situations involving violence perpetrated by
both intimate partners and strangers. 2 86 The statute states that the
Washington 2 84

279. Compare supra Part I.A (describing the statutory scheme developed in Illinois for
addressing domestic violence and providing protection and remedies to victims) with infra Part
IV.A (presenting approaches of three other states for treating police misconduct in situations of
domestic violence).
280. See infra Part IV.B (highlighting the shortcomings of legal remedies of other states in
comparison to those provided by the law of Illinois).
281. See infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the police duty to domestic violence victims created by
the Washington state mandatory arrest law and the way in which victims may bring suit for
breach of this duty).
282. See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing police immunity in California and the distinct
requirements under state law for establishing a special relationship).
283. See infra Part IV.A.3 (examining the special relationship exception as applied in New
York and the importance of orders of protection in establishing that relationship).
284. In 2005, domestic violence incidences were reported 53,770 times in the State of
Washington. Crime in Washington: 2005 Annual Report ii (2005), Washington Association of
Sheriffs and Police Chiefs, http://www.waspc.org/files.php?sort=dlcount (download filename
2005_CIW small.pdf). In the same year, twenty-eight percent of all homicides in the state were
domestic violence related. Id.
285. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.99 et seq. (West 2006).
286. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.99.010. The purpose provision of the Act reads:
The purpose of this chapter is to recognize the importance of domestic violence as a
serious crime against society and to assure the victim of domestic violence the
maximum protection from abuse which the law and those who enforce the law can
provide. The legislature finds that the existing criminal statutes are adequate to provide
protection for victims of domestic violence. However, previous societal attitudes have
been reflected in policies and practices of law enforcement agencies and prosecutors
which have resulted in differing treatment of crimes occurring between cohabitants and
of the same crimes occurring between strangers. Only recently has public perception of
the serious consequences of domestic violence to society and to the victims led to the
recognition of the necessity for early intervention by law enforcement agencies. It is
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primary duty of a police officer called to the scene of a domestic
disturbance is to enforce the laws that were violated.2 87 To carry out
this duty, Washington requires law enforcement to make warrantless
28 8
arrests in situations of domestic violence.
Under the law of the state, police officers who respond to domestic
violence calls are required to make an arrest when one of three criteria
is met: 1) there has been a felony assault; 2) there has been an injury to
the victim, even if the injury is not visible to the officer; or 3) the abuser
acted physically in a way that was intended to cause the victim to fear
imminent bodily injury or death.2 89 If none of these criteria are present
when the police officer responds to the scene, an arrest is not mandatory
and the officer is allowed to proceed using his discretion. 290 When any
one of the criteria is present, the courts have found that the police owe a
29 1
duty to the victim to arrest the perpetrator.
By requiring arrest, the State of Washington sought to ensure that
police officers would follow through with criminal sanctions when
the intent of the legislature that the official response to cases of domestic violence shall
stress the enforcement of the laws to protect the victim and shall communicate the
attitude that violent behavior is not excused or tolerated. Furthermore, it is the intent
of the legislature that criminal laws be enforced without regard to whether the persons
involved are or were married, cohabiting, or involved in a relationship.
Id. See also Roy v. City of Everett, 823 P.2d 1084, 1088 (Wash. 1992) (expounding on the
importance of applying criminal statutes in an evenhanded manner); Rizer, supra note 45, at 8-9
(citing Representative Alex Wood (D) from the state of Washington, who explained that the
legislature drafted and passed the statute because, "we had to do something").
287. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.99.030 (5).
288. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 10.31.100 (2)(c), 10.99.030 (6)(a) (setting forth the
circumstances in which warrantless arrest is permitted). The State of Washington is one of a
number of states that have enacted mandatory arrest laws in response to intimate partner abuse.
See supra note 274 (listing the states which have adopted mandatory arrest legislation). Despite
the large number of jurisdictions that have adopted mandatory arrest statutes, these laws are not
without critics. See Vi T. Vu, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales: A Hindrance in Domestic
Violence Policy Reform and Victory for the Institution of Male Dominance, 9 SCHOLAR 87, 9798 (2006) (outlining some of the criticisms of mandatory arrest statutes). Opponents contend that
such laws eliminate police discretion and are too inflexible to be practical and effective in
curtailing intimate partner abuse. Id. at 97. Additionally, empirical studies have yet to show that
making arrest mandatory has successfully reduced the incidence of domestic violence. See Emily
J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic Violence Policy,
2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1676-77 (2004) (discussing the consequences of studies regarding the
effectiveness of arrest in situations of intimate partner abuse).
289. WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 10.31.100 (2)(c).
290. Id. See also Gadd v. State, No. 20330-8-1, 1997 WL 796232, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec.
31, 1997) (finding that because an officer did not know that an assault was domestic in nature, he
had no duty under the statute to arrest and was permitted to act with discretion).
291. See Donaldson v. City of Seattle, 831 P.2d 1098, 1103 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992)
("Generally, where an officer has legal grounds to make an arrest he has considerable discretion
to do so. In regard to domestic violence, the rule is the reverse. If the officer has legal grounds to
arrest pursuant to the statute, he has a mandatory duty to make the arrest.").
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responding to domestic disturbances. 29 2 Mandatory arrests also provide
further protection for the victim by separating the victim from her
abuser and demonstrating to the perpetrator that intimate partner abuse
is not tolerated. 29 3 In certain circumstances, breach of the duty to arrest
is actionable and victims may recover when a police officer has failed to
make an arrest.2 94 For instance, the Washington Supreme Court has
recognized a plaintiff's right to sue for long-term, repeated failures to
make arrests. 295 A claim can be based on a single instance or a pattern
29 6
of non-enforcement of the law.

The duty to arrest and the legal remedy available if that duty is
These
breached, however, are subject to certain constraints. 297
constraints restrict the scope and extent of the duty of law enforcement
officers and, thus, diminish the protection provided to victims. 2 98 First,
the police officer is expressly immunized from suits arising from
arrests, enforcement of court orders, or any other actions or omissions in
good faith that occur in the course of an arrest or other on-scene
actions. 299 So long as the officer acted in good faith when responding
to domestic disturbances, he is protected from civil liability and suits
brought by both the victim and the abuser. 300 Therefore, while a victim

292. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.99.010.
293. Wanless, supra note 52, at 549, 552-53 (explaining why proponents of mandatory arrest
laws believe imposing criminal sanctions help the victim and deter the perpetrator from
committing further abusive acts). See Waits, supra note 66, at 304 (proposing that legal action is
an important part of facilitating the batterer's change in behavior).
294. See Roy v. City of Everett, 823 P.2d 1084, 1085 (Wash. 1992) (holding that the plaintiff
successfully stated a claim for the police's failure to arrest).
295. See id. (permitting the plaintiff to state a claim against the city of Everett and its police
department for failure to protect her daughter who was abused and harassed by her boyfriend for
more than a year before the boyfriend killed himself during his last attack on the daughter). In
that case, the plaintiff asserted that the police failed to take adequate steps to prevent the
boyfriend's abuse as required by the statute. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 1088 (interpreting the statute to provide immunity for an officer's good-faith
actions when responding to a domestic disturbance call). See also Donaldson, 831 P.2d at 1103
(expounding on the scope of the duty to arrest); Torres v. City of Anacortes, 981 P.2d 891, 900
(Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (discussing the time limit on the duty to arrest imposed by the statute).
298. Roy, 823 P.2d at 1088.
299. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.99.070. The immunity provision of the Washington
statute states:
A peace officer shall not be held liable in any civil action for an arrest based on
probable cause, enforcement in good faith of a court order, or any other action or
omission in good faith under this chapter arising from an alleged incident of domestic
violence brought by any party to the incident.
Id. See also Roy, 823 P.2d at 1088 (interpreting the immunity provision of the statute).
300. Roy, 823 P.2d at 1088. See also Wade v. Miles, No. 46446-9-I, 2001 WL 434851, at *4
(Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2001) (holding that because the officer had probable cause for arrest
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may bring suit against the police for failure to enforce the laws, once the
officer has intervened in the situation, his good-faith action or inaction
30 1
is covered by statutory immunity.
Second, the duty to arrest only exists for four hours after the domestic
disturbance is first reported to the police. 30 2 Once that time period has
passed, the domestic violence statute no longer mandates arrest and the
duty to the victim of domestic violence ceases. 30 3 This additional limit
on police duty demonstrates that the Washington statute is geared

incident and not
towards protecting the victim immediately after 30the
4
creating an extended duty of long-term protection.
Finally, the scope of an officer's duty to the victim is limited and thus

305
constrains the liability of law enforcement for breach of such duty.

While the law creates an obligation to arrest perpetrators under certain
circumstances, and even gives the power to make such arrests without a
warrant, the law does not create a duty to investigate. 30 6 Should the
abuser have fled by the time the police arrive, the police are not legally

required to conduct a search or proceed with a full investigation by

based on interviews with the victim and witnesses, the policeman was immune from suit).
301. Roy, 823 P.2d at 1088.
302. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.31.100 (2)(c).
303. Torres, 981 P.2d at 900. Consider, for example, that:
The husband commits an assault on the wife at breakfast, the wife does not request law
enforcement help at the time, the husband returns and at dinner a verbal dispute arises
with no threats and no physical assault, and the wife then requests law enforcement
help. By the explicit terms of RCW 10.31.100(2)[(c)] the officer would have no
mandatory duty to arrest because more than 4 hours had elapsed since the incident. A
fortiori the officer would have no mandatory duty to arrest if he found the abuser
elsewhere after the 4 hours have passed. His authority to arrest under those
circumstances is limited to his general statutory authority to arrest where he has
probable cause to believe that a person has committed a felony and there would, of
course, be no power to arrest for a misdemeanor since none was committed in his
presence.
Donaldson, 831 P.2d at 1104.
304. Id.
did the
305. Id. at 1103-04. The court reasoned that "[n]owhere in the original act
legislature create a special duty to conduct follow up investigations after the initial response
where the violator is absent . . . Liability for negligent investigation would be a substantial
change in the law and is certainly not required as a necessary inference from the duty to make
mandatory arrest." Id.
306. Id. See also Dever v. Fowler, 816 P.2d 1237, 1242 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (noting that
no Washington court has ever recognized the tort of negligent investigation).
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not
interviewing witnesses and following leads. 30 7 Thus, a victim will
30 8
be entitled to sue for failure to conduct an adequate investigation.
2. California
opted not to enact a mandatory arrest law and
consequently addressed police immunity and the cause of action of
domestic violence victims differently. 3 10 Under the law of California,
both victims of domestic violence and other citizens must sue under the
3 11
traditional negligence theory in order to recover against the police.
Consequently, the cause of action includes the burden of overcoming
the public duty doctrine by proving the special relationship3 12exception in
order to establish that the police owed a duty to the victim.
The California analysis for tort claims brought by domestic violence
victims against the police is the same as for any other citizen bringing a
civil suit against a municipal entity. 3 13 The general rule is that neither a
police officer nor a citizen has a duty to aid or protect others. 3 14 The
California 30 9

307. Donaldson, 831 P.2d at 1103 (holding that the police would normally have had a duty to
arrest the abuser, but that the duty did not exist based on the facts of the case given that the abuser
had fled by the time the police arrived).
308. Id. at 1103-05. The court ruled that such a duty would be too open-ended in terms of
duration and intensity:
Would [the duty to investigate] entail ignoring other calls for a domestic violence
response, ignoring other reported crimes... ? How long does such duty continue? To
the end of the officer's shift? Or is the department obligated to detail another officer to
take over?
Law enforcement must be vested with broad discretion to allocate
limited resources among the competing demands.
Id. at 1104.
309. California law enforcement received 181,362 domestic violence calls in 2005. Safe State,
Domestic Violence Facts: California, http://www.safestate.org/index.cfm?navD=42.
In that
year, 155 homicides were the result of domestic violence. Id.
310. See supra note 274 (listing certain states that have adopted mandatory arrest statutes).
311. See, e.g., Zelig v. County of L.A., 45 P.3d 1171, 1182-83 (Cal. 2002) (analyzing the suit
of a victim of domestic violence against the police under the traditional negligence
jurisprudence).
312. Davidson v. City of Westminster, 649 P.2d 894, 897 (Cal. 1982). The Davidson court
stated:
As a general rule, one owes no duty to control the conduct of another, nor to warn
those endangered by such conduct. Such a duty may arise, however, if "(a) a special
relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the
actor to control the third person's conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the
actor and the other which gives the other a fight to protection."
Id. See also Baker v. City of L.A., 233 Cal. Rptr. 760, 762-63 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) ("[The
police] can not be held liable for the injuries inflicted upon the respondent .
unless such a
special relationship exists.").
313. See, e.g., Zelig, 45 P.3d at 1182 (applying the general rules of negligence to the case of a
domestic violence victim as opposed to a domestic-violence-specific law).
314. Lugtu v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 28 P.3d 249, 257 (Cal. 2001) ("[L]aw enforcement
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gravity of the peril and the ease of the rescue are irrelevant; one cannot

be held liable for failing to help another. 315 However, if a special
relationship exists between the police and the victim, a duty may arise

conduct of another or to warn those
for the officer to control the
3 16
endangered by that conduct.
In California, as with Illinois common law, if the special relationship

exception is established, liability may be imposed upon an officer or
department who breaches the duty arising from that relationship. 3 17 To

determine whether this special relationship is found between the police
and the victim, the courts will consider several factors. 3 18 First, the

special relationship may exist if the officer voluntarily assumed a duty
by performing certain affirmative actions. 3 19 Second, the officer may
have a special relationship to the victim if he induced the individual to

rely on police protection by making representations or acting in a way
that signifies a promise to provide protection. 320 Finally, if the officer
contributed, increased, or changed the risk to the individual by way of
actions, the court will find that a special relationship
affirmative
1
exists.

32

officers, like other members of the public, generally do not have a legal duty to come to the aid of
[another] person."). See also Williams v. State, 664 P.2d 137, 140 (Cal. 1983) (noting that there
is no police duty to protect "[iun spite of the fact that our tax dollars support police functions").
315. Benavidez v. San Jose Police Dep't, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 157, 161 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)
(explaining that the rule applies to both the general public as well as police officers).
316. Zelig,45P.3dat 1182-83.
317. Ellsworth v. County of Orange, 2001 WL 1515802, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2001)
("'Generally, there is no legal 'duty,' and hence no liability for negligence, unless there is a
special relationship between the police and ...the victim'." (quoting Lopez v. City of San Diego,
235 Cal. Rptr. 583, 585 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)); Lee v. City of Oakland, 2006 WL 2046011, at *8
(Cal. Ct. App. July 24, 2006) (noting that such a relationship only arises in "a few narrow
circumstances," including situations where the misrepresentation of a police officer "induced a
specific individual's reliance, placed a specific individual in harms way, or lulled a specific
citizen into a false sense of security and then withdrew essential safety precautions.").
318. 46 CAL. JUR. 3D Negligence § 18 (2006).
319. Hartzler v. City of San Jose, 120 Cal. Rptr. 5, 7 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (reasoning that a
special relationship exists, "[e]ven though there is initially no liability on the part of the
government for its acts or omissions, once it undertakes action on behalf of a member of the
public, and thereby induces that individual's reliance... ").
320. See Ellsworth, 2001 WL 1515802, at *3 (holding that removal of the abuser by the police
from the premises was not an implied promise to protect and thus no duty of care arose); see also
Zelig, 45 P.3d at 1183 (finding that plaintiff did not allege facts that any officer had done
anything to induce the victim to rely upon special protection).
321. Benavidez v. San Jose Police Dep't, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 157, 164 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). In
Benavidez, the victim had called the police to report that her boyfriend was attacking her. Id. at
160. The boyfriend escaped shortly after the 911 call. Id. When the police arrived, they
interviewed the victim and offered to take her to the hospital, but she refused. Id. Shortly after
the police left, the boyfriend returned to the victim's home. Id. The victim again called the
police. Id. During the delay, the boyfriend broke the victim's window and stabbed her in the
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In addition to these common law rules, the California Tort Claims
Act (CTCA) also addresses the liability of the police, police
departments, and municipalities. 32 2 The statute provides immunity to
public entities except where otherwise provided by statute.3 2 3 Section
845 of the CTCA states that failure to exercise care or make an arrest
will not result in liability. 324 Further, police officers are immune from
3 25
negligence suits arising from discretionary actions.
The requirement that the police must increase the risk to the victim is
a significant obstacle to victims because it requires misfeasance on the
part of law enforcement. 32 6 Failure to act or an inadequate response
would not be actionable because the victim would not be any worse off
than if they had not called the police for help. 327 In order to satisfy this
head and neck with a shard of glass. Id. The court rejected the victim's argument that the police
increased her injury by using her as "bait" to entice her boyfriend to return to the home, providing
them with the opportunity to arrest him. Id. at 165. Consequently, no special relationship was
deemed to have existed. Id. at 167. See also Baker v. City of L.A., 233 Cal. Rptr. 760, 763-64
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the police did not increase the risk of harm to the plaintiff, a
victim of domestic violence, by returning a gun to her abuser, because the officer who returned
the gun was different than the officer who originally voluntarily entered into a special relationship
with the plaintiff by confiscating the gun).
322. California Tort Claims Act, CAL. GOv'T CODE § 815 et seq. (West 1995).
323. Id. at § 815. Section 815 provides:
Except as otherwise provided by statute:
(a) A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or
omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.
(b) The liability of a public entity established by this part
is subject to any
immunity of the public entity provided by statute, including this part, and is subject to
any defenses that would be available to the public entity if it were a private person.
Id.
324. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 845 (West 1995). Section 845 provides:
Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for failure to establish a police
department or otherwise to provide police protection service or, if police protection
service is provided, for failure to provide sufficient police protection service.
Id. See also Zelig, 45 P.3d at 1192 (listing examples of other types of immunity granted by
Section 845, including failure to provide police patrol and delay in responding to a call for
assistance against an assailant or a robber); Hartzler v. City of San Jose, 120 Cal. Rptr. 5, 6-7
(Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (interpreting § 845).
325. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 820.2 (West 1995):
Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury
resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the
exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.
Id. See also Ellsworth, 2001 WL 1515802, at *4 (holding that the officer could not be held liable
for failure to arrest or confine the subject because the decision to arrest was within the officer's
discretion).
326. See Zelig, 45 P.3d at 1183 (emphasizing the reluctance to impose liability on an officer
for nonfeasance).
327. See Ellsworth, 2001 WL 1515802, at *3 (stating that failure to confine the abuser when
there was no duty to arrest him or to warn the victim that the abuser was still free did not increase
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requirement of the special relationship exception in California, the
police would have to have acted in a way that made the situation worse

than before they became involved.328
In California, the determination of how much police protection
should be provided to the public and how it should be executed is
considered a political question for the legislature to address, as it did in
the CTCA.32 9 In contrast, the judiciary is not adequately informed to
To date, the California General
make such policy decisions. 330
of police
Assembly has not found it necessary to limit the immunity
33 1
officers, specifically in situations of domestic violence.

3. New York
York,3 3 2

the success of a civil suit by a domestic violence
In New
victim against the police also relies on the special relationship
exception, albeit with slightly different requirements than those in
California. 3 33 Although the existence of a special relationship between
the police and the victim is difficult to prove, the law of New York
lightens the burden for victims who have obtained an order of protection
her risk of harm).
328. Id. "'[S]uch a relationship has been held to depend on representations or conduct by the
police which cause the victim(s) to detrimentally rely on the police such that the risk of harm as
the result of police negligence is something more than that to which the victim was already
exposed."' Id. (quoting Lopez, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 585).
329. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 845 (West 1995) Law Revision Commission Comments. "To permit
review of these decisions by judges and juries would remove the ultimate decision-making
authority from those politically responsible for making the decisions." Id. (citing 4 CAL. L. REV.
COMM. REPORTS 801 (1963)).
330. See Mann v. State, 139 Cal. Rptr. 82, 85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). "[S]ection [845] was
designed to prevent political decisions of policy-making officials of government from being
second-guessed by judges and juries in personal injury litigation. In other words, essentially
budgetary decisions of these officials were not to be subject to judicial review in tort litigation."
Id. (internal citation omitted).
331. 6 WITKIN SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW TORTS § 858, at 220-21 (9th ed. 1988).
332. In 2001, almost half of New York homicide cases where the relationship was reported
involved a relative or an intimate partner. NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SERVICES, 2000-2001 CRIME AND JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT-PART 1: CRIMES REPORTED,
http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/cja_00_ 01/secla.pdf. Additionally, over half of
homeless mothers in New York City have a history of being victims of domestic violence. Youth
Services Opportunities Project, Homelessness in New York City, http://www.ysop.org/
statistics.htm. In New York City especially, which is densely populated, the need for domestic
violence services is acute; however, there is a lack of emergency services available in the city and
for every one woman who is able to access these services, fifty are turned away. The New York
Women's Foundation, Communities Coordinated Against Violence: A Model Program,
http://www.nywf.org/faiily-violence-project.htmil.
333. See, e.g., Kircher v. City of Jamestown, 543 N.E.2d 443, 445 (N.Y. 1989) (applying the
general rules of negligence to the case of a domestic violence victim, as opposed to a domesticviolence-specific law).
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against their abuser. 334 In contrast, victims who have not been granted
an order are not afforded the same leniency and thus experience further
difficulty in proving the special relationship. 335 This inequity may
vulnerable and with fewer viable
leave some victims and their children
336
misconduct.
police
for
remedies

As in California, no distinct cause of action for domestic violence
victims exists in New York. 337 Instead, victims must assert negligence
claims to recover against the municipality in which they live and the
police officers serving that municipality. 33 8 Because governmental

entities are immune from civil claims under the public duty doctrine, a
negligence claim will only be successful in New York if the plaintiff
first establishes the existence of a special relationship between herself
3 39
and law enforcement.
In order to establish that a police officer owed a duty as a result of a
special relationship, a domestic violence victim in New York must
establish four elements. 340 First, the municipality must have assumed a1
34
duty to act on behalf of the victim by its promises or actions.
334. See Berliner v. Thompson, 578 N.Y.S.2d 687, 689 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (describing
how an order of protection serves as proof of several elements of the test used to determine
whether a special relationship exists).
335. See Sorichetti v. City of New York, 482 N.E.2d 70, 75-76 (N.Y. 1985) (noting that "[i]n
extraordinary instances" a special relationship was found, and limiting, for the most part, the class
to which a duty is owed to those who are included within the terms of the order of protection).
336. See id. (placing such importance and emphasis on the existence of an order of protection
that the inference can be drawn about the legal disadvantages a litigant without one may face).
337. See supra note 311 and accompanying text (explaining that the legal remedy for
domestic violence victims against the police in California is the same as the remedy for any other
citizen seeking to sue a municipal entity).
338. See, e.g., Cuffy v. City of New York, 505 N.E.2d 937, 939-42 (N.Y. 1987) (analyzing a
domestic violence victim's suit against the police for failure to protect under negligence law).
339. Id. at 940 (recognizing the right to recover for negligent failure to provide police services
where a special duty exists to a particular individual).
340. Raucci v. Town of Rotterdam, 902 F.2d 1050, 1055-56 (2d Cir. 1990) (listing the
elements of the special relationship exception); G. Kristian Miccio, Exiled from the Province of
Care: Domestic Violence, Duty and Conceptions of State Accountability, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 111,
160 (2005) (describing the four-factor test employed by New York courts in determining whether
a special relationship exists).
341. Raucci, 902 F.2d at 1055-56. Mr. and Ms. Raucci were involved in an abusive
relationship and a violent custody dispute over their son, Chad. Id. at 1052. Mr. Raucci had
threatened Ms. Raucci on numerous occasions, including one incident in which he tried to drive
her off the road. Id. Ms. Raucci reported the abuse to the Rotterdam police on several occasions
and informed them of the order of protection she had been granted. Id. at 1052-53. Instead of
confronting Mr. Raucci after the complaints were made by Ms. Raucci, the police trained Ms.
Raucci to tape threatening calls made by her husband for evidentiary purposes. Id. at 1053. One
day, Mr. Raucci followed Ms. Raucci in his car, waited for her to park and pulled a rifle on her
when she got out of her car. Id. During the scuffle that ensued, Chad was shot and killed and
Ms. Raucci was wounded. Id. Ms. Raucci sued the Town of Rotterdam for negligence. Id. The
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Second, the municipality or its agent must have known that inaction
would lead to harm. 342 Third, direct contact between the agent and the
victim must have occurred. 3 43 And finally, the victim must demonstrate
344
that she reasonably relied on the affirmative actions of the police.
Once a plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to state a cause of
action, the officer's actions are subjected to further analysis to
34 5
determine whether those actions were reasonable.
Although an order of protection is not necessary to establish a cause
of action in New York, a plaintiff who has been issued an order by the
court has a significant advantage. 346 The courts have been clear in
stating that the existence of an order of protection does not absolutely
establish a special relationship or prove that one existed. 34 7 However,
courts in New York have found that an order of protection evinces a
judicial determination that the victim requires protection from his or her
abuser, who has been categorized by a judge as violent and
dangerous. 34 8 Further, the order is evidence that harm might result in

court found that the police had assumed a duty to Ms. Raucci by training her to tape the calls, and
because the police had notice of violations of an order of protection, there was a duty to respond
and investigate. Id. at 1056. Thus, the first element of a special relationship was satisfied. Id.
342. Id. at 1055-56. The court found that the police knew through statements by Ms. Raucci
and the telephone call recordings that Mr. Raucci was dangerous. Id. at 1056. Additionally, the
court held that the order of protection was evidence that inaction on their part would lead to harm.
Id.
343. Id. at 1055-56. The interactions Ms. Raucci had with the police department satisfied the
direct contact element of the special relationship test. Id. at 1057. Additionally, because of the
order of protection, the mother's direct contact also substituted for Chad's direct contact with the
police. Id.
344. Id. at 1055-56. The fact that Ms. Raucci never changed her schedule over the period of
time that her husband harassed her served as adequate evidence that she reasonably relied on
promises of protection made by the police department. Id. at 1058.
345. Sorichetti v. City of New York, 482 N.E.2d 70, 76 (N.Y. 1985) (stating that the actions
of a governmental employee will be analyzed using the reasonableness standard); Mastroianni v.
County of Suffolk, 691 N.E.2d 613, 617 (N.Y. 1997) (finding that the reasonableness of the
conduct of the officer and police department is a question for the fact finder).
346. Compare Mastroianni, 691 N.E.2d at 616 (reasoning that the existence of an order of
protection automatically satisfies two elements of the cause of action), with Berliner v.
Thompson, 578 N.Y.S.2d 687, 689 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (finding that "the order satisfies proof
of an affirmative duty to act, knowledge that inaction could lead to harm and justifiable reliance
on the defendant's affirmative undertaking. All that remains is the direct contact necessary to
apprise the police of the existence of the order and its violation.").
347. Sorichetti,482 N.E.2d at 76.
The fact that an injury occurs because of a violation of an order of protection does not
in itself create municipal liability. An arrest may not be warranted in each case, and
the failure of the police to take such action will not alone be determinative of the
reasonableness of their conduct.
Id.
348. Id. See also Berliner, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 689 (affirming the finding in Sorichetti that an
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the absence of protection, and violations, thus, should be promptly
responded to and thoroughly investigated. 34 9 Therefore, in New York,
an order of protection is sufficient evidence to satisfy the first three
elements of the special relationship test. 350 Even where the order of
protection does not automatically establish these elements, the analysis
35 1
is more flexible for plaintiffs who have been issued an order.
Therefore, victims of domestic violence are significantly advantaged if
they have obtained an order, and face further legal obstacles if they have
3 52
not.

An order of protection is also crucial in New York in instances where
a child is involved in the domestic dispute and is injured by the

Because of the
misconduct of law enforcement personnel. 3 53
insubstantial nature of the interaction between a child and an officer on
most domestic violence calls, a child would normally be precluded from
bringing a claim. 354 However, New York courts have held that in
instances where the parent of the child has obtained an order of
protection, the existence of the order satisfies the direct contact element
for the child.3 55 The standards are relaxed when an order exists because
3 56
it represents the municipality's previous involvement in the case.
order of protection "is presumptive evidence that the individual whose conduct is proscribed [is]
...a dangerous or violent person." (quoting Sorichetti,482 N.E.2d at 75)).
349. Sorichetti,482 N.E.2d at 75-76.
350. Berliner,578 N.Y.S.2d at 689. But see Mastroianni,691 N.E.2d at 616 (noting that only
two elements were satisfied).
351. Mastroianni,691 N.E.2d at 616 (determining that whether an order of protection satisfies
the direct contact element depends on the facts of each case).
352. The courts in Sorichetti, 482 N.E.2d at 75-76, Berliner, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 689, and
Mastroianni,691 N.E.2d at 616 each relied heavily on the fact that an order of protection had
been issued on behalf of the plaintiff in determining whether or not a special relationship existed.
353. See Kircher v. City of Jamestown, 543 N.E.2d 443, 446-47 (N.Y. 1989) (noting the
importance of the outstanding order of protection in Sorichetti, whereas no such order existed in
this case); Cuffy v. City of New York, 505 N.E.2d 937, 941 (N.Y. 1987) ("Moreover, the
presence of a judicial order of protection contributed to our conclusion in Sorichetti that an
actionable relationship existed.").
354. See Sorichetti, 482 N.E.2d at 75 (holding that a special relationship requires that there be
some direct contact between the police and the injured party).
355. Raucci v. Town of Rotterdam, 902 F.2d 1050, 1057 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that the order
of protection obtained by the mother extended to her children and, thus, established direct contact
with the police). See also Cuffy, 505 N.E.2d at 941 (explaining the rationale of waiving the direct
contact requirement for a child whose mother had obtained an order of protection); Sorichetti,482
N.E.2d at 75 (holding that the mother's contact with the police also created a special relationship
between the police and her child); Kircher, 543 N.E.2d at 446-47 (acknowledging previous
judicial flexibility under circumstances of mother and child, but refusing to waive the direct
contact requirement for individuals engaged in other types of relationships).
356. Kircher, 543 N.E.2d at 446-47 (explaining the reasoning in Sorichetti that "[an]
outstanding judicial order of protection signif[ies] the municipality's prior involvement in the
domestic turmoil that ultimately led to the infant's injuries, thus providing a justification for
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In addition to the obstacles that domestic violence victims face in
establishing the special relationship exception and successfully bringing
a claim against the police, the cause of action in New York was not
specifically crafted to protect victims of domestic violence. 357 It is
available to any citizen who has been subjected to police misconduct
and can satisfy the burdens of the special relationship test.35 8 However,
in reality, there is only a very narrow class of cases that can satisfy these
requirements. 359 The language of the rulings in this line of cases

demonstrates that New York courts consciously sought to limit the
number of claimants who could successfully sue a municipality, law
enforcement agencies, and the agencies' personnel. 360 The courts have
stated that law enforcement agencies should be allowed extensive
36 1
discretion with regard to officer conduct and resource allocation.
The difficult elements of the special relationship exception demonstrate
36 2
the judicial effort to diminish the number of successful suits.
B. Illinois Law Surpasses That of Other States
The cause of action created by the IDVA is more comprehensive than
36 3
the remedies available to victims of domestic violence in other states.
It provides more expansive protection to victims in their interactions
with law enforcement, and it also successfully addresses many of the
legal challenges in other jurisdictions that prevent victims from

relaxing the direct contact requirement.").
357. See generally Schuster v. City of New York, 154 N.E.2d 534 (N.Y. 1958) (applying the
test to the case of a citizen being threatened after supplying information to the police leading to
the arrest of a fugitive); Cuffy, 505 N.E.2d 937 (evaluating the nature of the relationship between
police and victim in a violent landlord-tenant dispute).
358. Cuffy, 505 N.E.2d at 940.
359. Sorichetti, 482 N.E.2d at 75-76 (describing how the special relationship exception only
exists in "extraordinary instances" and explaining how a court's reliance on orders of protection
"necessarily limit[s]" the class of victims to whom the police owe a duty).
360. See Raucci, 902 F.2d at 1055.
The reason for limiting this exception is that a municipality's duty to provide police
protection is owed to the public at large rather than to any individual or class of
citizens, and questions of resource allocation, such as how much protection [to]
provide to an individual or class, are left to the discretion of the municipal policy
makers.
Id.
361. Cuffy, 505 N.E.2d at 940 (describing how a municipality's duty to provide police
protection is owed to the public, not to individuals, and has long been regarded as a resourceallocating function that should be left to policy makers).
362. See id. (explaining the rationale behind declining to subject government entities and law
enforcement agencies to tort liabilities).
363. See infra Part IV.B (analyzing the Illinois cause of action for victims of domestic
violence as compared to those available in other states).
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prevailing in civil suits against the police. 3 64 Compared to other states,
the right of action for domestic violence victims in Illinois is available
to a larger class of individuals, including victims in a variety of different
types of relationships as well as certain family members. 365 The Illinois
cause of action also enables victims of domestic violence to sue for a
wider variety of police misconduct. 36 6 Furthermore, the Illinois cause
of action specifically recognizes the unique problem of inadequate
police response to situations of domestic violence and properly limits
immunity to encourage police action and to allow victims to recover in
367
the event of police misconduct.
1. The Illinois Right of Action Is Available to a
Larger Class
The right of action created by the IDVA is available to more
individuals than remedies in other states. 3 68 Any plaintiff who is a
member of the protected class as designated by Article II can potentially
bring a claim under the IDVA. 369 Courts in Illinois have interpreted
this protected class to encompass a broad group of individuals that
includes not only the victim herself, but also her children and other
family members. 370 This inclusiveness is critical given the fact that
domestic violence often affects and threatens the safety of individuals
other than the victim. 37 1 Police protection is equally necessary for
364. Id.
365. See infra Part IVB. 1 (discussing the expansive class of individuals protected under the
IDVA as it compares to the more exclusive groups covered in other states).
366. See infra Part IV.B.2 (arguing that victims of domestic violence in Illinois are protected
against more forms of police misconduct than in other states).
367. See infra Part IV.B.3 (explaining how the Illinois cause of action was crafted specifically
to address the needs of domestic violence victims in a way unlike any other state).
368. See supra Part III.A (describing the IDVA's protected class). Cf supra Part IV.A
(analyzing the limitations placed on the causes of action in other states).
369. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/201(2004). The individuals protected by the Act include:
(i) any person abused by a family or household member; (ii) any high-risk adult with
disabilities who is abused, neglected, or exploited by a family or household member;
(iii) any minor child or dependent adult in the care of such person; and (iv) any person
residing or employed at a private home or public shelter which is housing an abused
family or household member.
Id. See also Calloway v. Kinkelaar, 659 N.E.2d 1322, 1328 (Il. 1995) (defining who is eligible
to bring a claim under the IDVA).
370. See supra note 196 (listing cases in Illinois which have expanded the protected class
under the IDVA); Leslie Landis, Project Manager for the City of Chicago Domestic Violence
Project, Presentation at Loyola University Chicago School of Law (Sept. 6, 2006) (on file with
author) (describing the types of relationships protected by the IDVA as very broad).
371. Friends or other family members of the victim are also often represented among the
fatalities associated with domestic violence. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE ON VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN, About Domestic Violence, http://www.usdoj.gov/ovw/domviolence.htm (last
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children and other household members exposed to domestic violence. 372
By including blood relatives in the class of protected people to whom
the police owe a duty, Illinois has recognized the practical effects of
373
domestic violence in a way that other states have not.
For instance, in New York, the success of a suit for police
misconduct brought on behalf of a child relies heavily on the existence

of an order of protection. 374 In Illinois, on the other hand, a suit against

law enforcement can be brought on behalf of a child regardless of
whether there is an order of protection because children are part of the
IDVA's protected class. 375
In abusive households, children are
frequently victims of domestic violence and by extending the unlimited
right of action to this vulnerable population, Illinois law protects them
37 6
more thoroughly than does New York law.
Furthermore, no additional limitations have been placed on those who
are permitted to bring a suit against the police under the IDVA. 37 7 The
Illinois cause of action does not favor victims who have obtained an
order of protection. 37 8 Instead, it provides an identical remedy to all
victims of domestic violence by allowing a victim to sue the police for
misconduct regardless of whether an order of protection was

visited on Mar. 31, 2007) (reporting that domestic violence can also have an impact on friends,
co-workers and other member of the victims family). In Washington, family members and
friends constitute twelve percent of all homicides stemming from domestic violence. John
Iwasaki, Woman Finds Brother Stabbed, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 26, 2006, at B5.
See also DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COORDINATING COUNCIL, Dynamics of Domestic Violence,
http://www.dvcc.delaware.gov/dynamics.htmi (last visited on Mar. 30, 2007) (explaining that one
technique used by abusers is to threaten the victim's children, relatives, or pets).
372. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (explaining the rate at which children of
abusive relationships are abused themselves). See also Marielsa Bernard, Domestic Violence's
Impact On Children, MD. B. J., May-June 2003, at 12 (estimating that somewhere between three
and ten million children are exposed to domestic violence every year).
373. Illinois Coalition Against Domestic Violence, supra note 99 (reporting that Illinois
domestic violence service programs served over 10,000 children in 2005).
374. Sorichetti v. City of New York, 482 N.E.2d 70, 75-76 (N.Y. 1985)
375. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/201 (2004); Calloway v. Kinkelaar, 659 N.E.2d 1322, 1328
(Ill. 1995); Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 541 N.E.2d 872, 875 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that the
IDVA covered the abusive relationship of a mother and her adult son).
376. See Maureen K. Collins, Nicholson v. Williams: Who Is Failing To Protect Whom?
Collaboratingthe Agendas of Child Welfare Agencies and Domestic Violence Services To Better
Protect and Support Battered Mothers and Their Children, 38 NEW ENG. L. REv. 725, 725-26
(2003-2004) (explaining the link between domestic violence and child abuse and suggesting the
two issues should be treated together to better protect both mother and child).
377. Calloway, 659 N.E.2d at 1328 (stating that anyone who is protected under the IDVA can
potentially bring a claim against the police).
378. Id. (listing the requirements for bringing a cause of action and not mentioning an order of
protection among those elements).
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obtained. 379 While Article II of the IDVA facilitates the granting of
orders of protection and considers such orders an important remedy for
victims of domestic violence, the Illinois Supreme Court did not create
a lesser burden for victims protected by a court order. 380 Some

domestic violence victims do not obtain an order of protection, either
out of choice or necessity, yet they still require police protection 38in1
instances where intimate partner abuse recurs or escalates.
Therefore, unlike New York, where a victim may satisfy three of the
elements of the cause of action with an order of protection, an

individual in Illinois has an equal chance of recovering from a police
officer regardless of whether an order of protection was been issued on
382
the victim's behalf.
2. The Right of Action Is Available for More
Types of Police Misconduct
Under the IDVA, law enforcement officers owe more duties to

victims of domestic violence than in other states, and thus, victims
383
benefit from more thorough and effective police response.
Consequently, victims can recover for a wider range of police
misconduct when any one of these duties is breached in a willful and
3 84
wanton manner.

379. Id.
380. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214 (2004) (providing for the issuance of orders of protection).
The purpose statement of the IDVA explains the legislature's view that orders of protection are a
crucial part of protecting victims of domestic violence. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/102(4) (2004).
The IDVA was created to:
[s]upport the efforts of victims of domestic violence to avoid further abuse by promptly
entering and diligently enforcing court orders which prohibit abuse and, when
necessary, reduce the abuser's access to the victim and address any related issues of
child custody and economic support, so that victims are not trapped in abusive
situations by fear of retaliation, loss of a child, financial dependence, or loss of
accessible housing or services.
Id. See also Taylor, supra note 183, at 406 (outlining the process through which victims can
obtain an order of protection rapidly and effectively).
381. See Landis, supra note 370 (describing how, in drafting the IDVA, advocates and
legislators took into account the fact that not all victims of domestic violence would seek an order
of protection); see also supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text (outlining the obstacles that
prevent domestic violence victims from reporting abuse or seeking legal protection, such as
orders of protection).
382. Calloway, 659 N.E.2d at 1328. See also supra notes 332-52 and accompanying text
(describing the special relationship exception test in New York).
383. Compare supra Part lII.A (discussing the duties required of law enforcement under the
IDVA), with supra Part IV.A (describing the remedies for police misconduct in Washington,
California, and New York).
384. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/304(a) (2004) (listing law enforcement's duties to domestic
violence victims, which also include seizing and taking inventory of weapons, accompanying the
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In order to adequately respond to a domestic violence call, the IDVA

states that a police officer must use all reasonable means to prevent
further abuse, for example by arresting the perpetrator, escorting the
victim to safety, or engaging in various other activities outlined in
Section 304.385 If a law enforcement agent fails to perform these duties,
or executes them in an egregious manner, and the action is willful and
wanton, the victim can bring civil suit against the officer. 3 86 In Illinois,
both affirmative acts and failure to act can constitute misconduct under
3 87
the IDVA cause of action.
The remedy available to victims in Illinois is more expansive
compared to the Washington remedy because the Washington
mandatory-arrest statute only imposes a duty to arrest under certain
circumstances. 388 This duty only arises once the officer is on the scene
and able to assess whether the requisite criteria exist.3 89 Importantly, a

victim in Washington may only state a claim against the police if the
criteria are met and the mandatory arrest is not carried out. 39 0 Since the
police duty to victims of domestic violence in Washington is limited to
arrest, the duty ceases after four hours, and there is no duty for the
police to continue an investigation after the abuser has escaped, victims
in Washington, as compared to Illinois, are limited in the type of police
391
misconduct for which they may recover.
The IDVA cause of action is also applicable to more forms of police
misconduct than the remedy provided by California law. 3 92 A police
victim to her place of residence to remove personal belongings, offering the victim immediate and
adequate information about relief available, providing referrals to service agencies, and advising
the victim to seek medical attention to treat injuries and preserve evidence).
385. Id.
386. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/305 (2004); Calloway, 659 N.E.2d at 1329 (reasoning that
analysis of legislative intent supports the conclusion that the "legislature unambiguously intended
to limit the liability of law enforcement personnel to willful and wanton acts or omissions in
enforcing the Act."); Moore v. Green, 848 N.E.2d 1015, 1026 (I. 2006).
387. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/305 (2004) (creating immunity for a police officer's willful and
wanton acts or omissions).
388. See supra notes 289-91 and accompanying text (listing the circumstances in which there
is a statutory duty to arrest under Washington statute).
389. See supra notes 297-308 and accompanying text (explaining that the Washington
Domestic Violence Act has been interpreted to limit the mandatory duty to arrest and does not
create an ongoing duty to investigate).
390. DAVID K. DEWOLF & KELLER W. ALLEN, 16 WASHINGTON PRACTICE SERIES: TORT
LAw AND PRACTICE § 14.11 (3d ed.).
391. Donaldson v. City of Seattle, 831 P.2d 1098, 1105 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that
law enforcement duties under the Washington Domestic Violence Prevention Act are limited to
arrests while the perpetrator is still at the scene).
392. Compare supra Part III.A (describing the law enforcement duties under the IDVA), with
supra Part IV.A.2 (assessing the limited duties required of police in California).
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officer can be liable for both his acts and omissions in responding to a
domestic violence call in Illinois. 39 3 In other words, the right of action
recognized by Calloway allows the plaintiff to sue for police
nonfeasance, such as delay in responding to calls or failure to interfere
in a violent altercation. 394 In contrast, California requires that an officer
39 5
have contributed to the victim's harm by affirmative 39action.
6
Therefore, only police misfeasance is actionable in California.
For instance, consider the case of Ronyale White. 3 97 In Illinois,
under the cause of action created by the IDVA, White's executor was
able to state a claim based on evidence that officers Green and
Cornelius took an exceedingly long time to reach White's home after
her 911 call. 39 8 This delay, combined with evidence showing they
never entered the victim's home or investigated her call, was sufficient
to constitute a claim in Illinois. 399 In California, however, the deficient
conduct of Green and Cornelius would not be actionable because
inaction or nonfeasance does not support a finding of a special
relationship. 40 0 Green and Cornelius never took affirmative action that
increased the harm to White. 40 1 Thus, the claim brought by the
40 2
executor of White's estate would have been precluded in California.

393. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/305 (2004); Moore v. Green, 848 N.E.2d 1015, 1018 (111.2006)
(allowing the plaintiff to state a claim for law enforcement failure to act). See also supra note
247 (quoting the definition of actionable conduct as defined by Illinois courts).
394. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/305 (2004).
395. See supra notes 318-20 and accompanying text (describing the special relationship
requirement in California which makes it difficult for a victim of domestic violence to sue for
police nonfeasance).
396. Zelig v. County of L.A., 45 P.3d 1171, 1183 (Cal. 2002) (citing Hoff v. Vacaville
Unified School Dist., 968 P.2d 522, 527 (Cal. 1998) (explaining that courts in California have
been reluctant to impose liability for nonfeasance and, therefore, police may only be held liable
for their affirmative actions). See also Miccio, supra note 340, at 149-50 (describing an
action/inaction paradigm in California law and how courts incorrectly categorize failure to act as
nonfeasance when it is actually misfeasance-the police action is merely "not carried to
fruition").
397. See supra Part I (describing the facts of the murder of Ronyale White).
398. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (explaining the holding in Moore).
399. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text (illustrating Green's and Cornelius's willful
and wanton conduct).
400. See supra notes 317-21 and accompanying text (describing what is necessary to establish
the special relationship exception in California).
401. Moore v. Green, 822 N.E.2d 69, 71 (111. App. Ct. 2004) (reporting that a witness saw the
police car arrive at White's house and then leave without investigating or providing assistance);
Hussain, supra note 7 (illustrating the inadequate response of the Chicago police officers after
White's 911 call).
402. See supra Part IV.B.2 (describing what is required for a plaintiff to succeed in a
negligence suit against the police in California).
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3. The Right of Action Specifically Addresses Domestic Violence
The Illinois cause of action more effectively addresses the epidemic
of domestic violence and the under-enforcement of laws protecting
victims than do the remedies provided by other states. 403 The IDVA
and the right of action recognized in Calloway were specifically tailored
to the unique characteristics of the crime of domestic violence and the
needs of victims in abusive relationships. 40 4 The Illinois General
Assembly enacted the IDVA to address the problem of domestic

violence by providing support for victims and encouraging active police
intervention. 40 5 The IDVA outlines remedies for protected parties,
police duties, and limits liability for law enforcement, with the goal of
aiding domestic violence victims and reducing the rate of intimate
partner abuse.

40 6

Furthermore, Illinois has succeeded in facilitating litigation by
victims against the police as a tool to ensure proper law enforcement

conduct. 40 7 The Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 305
in Calloway ensures that police duties to domestic violence victims are
carried out in compliance with the IDVA. 4 08 As the holding in
Calloway states, the cause of action is an effective mechanism for
ensuring that the important purposes of the IDVA are actively pursued
4 09
within the law enforcement community.
In contrast, neither of the remedies provided by California or New
York were crafted with the intention of providing specialized protection
to domestic violence victims or incentives for appropriate police
response to that particular crime. 4 10 In fact, in both states, victims must
403. Compare 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/102 (2004) (explaining that the legislature actively
sought to reduce the incidence of domestic violence in Illinois and improve protections for
victims), with supra Part IV.A.2 & 3 (discussing the right of action against municipal entities in
California and New York, which are not specifically geared toward domestic violence victims).
404. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/102 (2004); Calloway v. Kinkelaar, 659 N.E.2d 1322, 1326-27
(111. 1995).
405. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/102(1), (4) & (5) (2004). See also supra notes 216-17,221-24
and accompanying text (explaining the Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation of the legislative
intent behind the IDVA).
406. See supra Part IL.A (discussing the provisions of the IDVA).
407. See generally Calloway, 659 N.E.2d at 1326-27 (creating a cause of action specifically
geared towards victims who seek to sue the police for their inappropriate response to a domestic
violence call). See also Webster, supra note 18, at 674 (suggesting that suits against the police by
victims of domestic violence under the limited immunity provision of the IDVA are a successful
way to "encourage police officers' compliance with law enforcement protocols").
408. Moore v. Green, 848 N.E.2d 1015, 1026 (111.2006).
409. Calloway, 659 N.E.2d at 1328 (reporting that the cause of action was created "[tlo give
effect to the legislature's purpose and intent in enacting the Domestic Violence Act.").
410. See supra notes 311, 337-38 and accompanying text (explaining that police duties in
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sue under the same negligence theory as would be asserted by any other
individual who seeks to bring civil suit against the police. 4 11 While
Illinois law emphasizes the special duties that police owe to victims of

domestic violence and enables victims to bring suit for police
wrongdoing, 4 12 the law in both New York and California holds that
police rarely have a duty to anyone and aims to discourage suits against

the police by victims of crime. 4 13 Law enforcement officers in New
York and California are not encouraged to treat domestic violence
differently than any other type of crime, yet statistics and studies show

that intimate partner abuse is a distinct type of crime that requires
special police intervention. 4 14 Illinois acknowledges the difference
between intimate partner abuse and other types of violent crime and
created the IDVA and the Calloway cause of action to provide
appropriate police services and protect victims of domestic violence in a
4 15
way that the other states have not.
C. The Weaknesses of Illinois Law
Changes in attitudes and practices toward domestic violence are slow,
and Illinois law still does not protect victims of domestic violence to the
fullest possible extent. 4 16
Despite pro-victim legislation, police
training, and public pressure, police still under-enforce the laws and
respond inadequately to domestic disturbances. 4 17 Law enforcement is
a critical key to reducing this violence, but little progress will be made
if police departments and personnel fail to fulfill their assigned
duties. 4 18 The cause of action in Illinois still presents obstacles for
both New York and California are the same for all citizens, including domestic violence victims).
411. See generally Zelig v. County of L.A., 45 P.3d 1171 (Cal. 2002) (requiring domestic
violence victims to establish the special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine that
applies to all citizens); Sorichetti v. City of New York, 482 N.E.2d 70, 74 (N.Y. 1985) (same).
412. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/304 (2004) (listing police duties to domestic violence victims);
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/305 (2004) (creating limited immunity for police officers whose
conduct in responding to domestic violence altercations is willful and wanton).
413. See supra notes 309-12, 333, 357-62 and accompanying text (describing the law
regarding police duties in California and New York and the way in which both states have
attempted to limit the number of suits filed again police officers and departments).
414. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text (explaining how domestic violence is a
unique crime and assaults perpetrated by intimate partners are different and more likely to be
repeated than assaults by strangers).
415. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/102 (2004).
416. See Miccio, supra note 340, at 164 (describing the continuing "callousness" of law
enforcement despite their sworn duty to "protect and serve").
417. See supra note 115 (characterizing domestic violence prevention laws and police policies
as still under-enforced).
418. Webster, supra note 18, at 668-69 (suggesting that, with respect to orders of protection,
victims are not safe unless police "respond sternly to reported violations").
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victims who wish to bring civil suit against the police, 4 19 and even when
a victim succeeds in stating a claim, the suit may be quietly settled,
resulting in very little systemic change. 4 20
Moreover, further
difficulties arise under the IDVA cause of action when the victim
chooses to sue the individual officer whose willful and wanton conduct
42 1
is the reason for the claim.
Although the right of action created by the IDVA is more accessible
to a larger number of individuals for a wider variety of misconduct, it

422
still presents an uphill battle for the victim who elects to bring suit.

In order to state a claim, the police officers must have breached their
duty to the victim in a willful and wanton manner. 42 3 The plaintiff must
show that the police engaged in "a course of action which shows an

actual or deliberate intention to cause harm or which, if not intentional,
shows an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of
others." 4 24 In situations of domestic violence, this standard is too high
because such egregious misconduct may lead to fatalities. 4 25 As the
cause of action exists now, police may be liable for willful and wanton
behavior but not for negligent response to domestic violence calls,

which can be equally harmful. 426 By granting immunity to police for
their negligent actions, under-enforcement of the law will persist,
victims in Illinois will remain vulnerable, and the risk of escalation of
42 7
abuse will continue to exist.
419. See infra Part IV.C (outlining the various deficiencies in protection for victims of
domestic violence under the IDVA); Moore v. Green, 848 N.E.2d 1015, 1027 (111.2006) (noting
that while the cause of action recognized by Calloway serves the purposes of the IDVA, "a
plaintiff seeking relief under the Act has a heavy burden to carry.").
420. Andrea A. Curcio, Breaking The Silence: Using a Notification Penalty and Other
Notification Measures in Punitive Damages Cases, 1998 WIs. L. REV. 343, 377 (1998)
(suggesting that confidential settlement agreements can increase risk to the public by "hiding
information critical to the public health and safety").
421. See generally Moore v. Green, 848 N.E.2d 1015 (Ill. 2006) (allowing plaintiffs to state a
claim of statutory negligence against the police based on their willful and wanton treatment of the
victim's case which lead to her death).
422. See supra Part 1V.B.1 (suggesting that the cause of action under the IDVA provides
remedies to more individuals affected by domestic violence by protecting victims, their children
and other family members).
423. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/305 (2004).
424. Sneed v. Howell, 716 N.E.2d 336, 343 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
425. See generally Calloway v. Kinkelaar, 659 N.E.2d 1322 (Ill. 1995) (police failure to
respond led to plaintiffs abduction at gunpoint); Sneed v. Howell, 716 N.E.2d 336 (111.App. Ct.
1999) (ex-husband shot and killed victim after police failed to respond to victim's repeated calls);
Moore v. Green, 848 N.E.2d 1015 (Ill. 2006) (abuser shot and killed victim when police delayed
in responding and investigating).
426. Calloway, 659 N.E.2d at 1322 (specifically rejecting the notion that a police officer could
be held liable for negligent performance of his duties under the IDVA).
427. PETER SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 102-
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Even when victims do prevail in stating a claim against the police,
the claim is often settled out of the public eye. 4 28 Municipalities may
4 29
choose to pay the victim to avoid litigation and public scrutiny.
While the victim may be made whole by receiving a settlement, the
police department will be less likely to enact systemic change within the
police force than if they had been found liable for misconduct in a trial
and subjected to public scrutiny for their actions. 4 30 The current law in
Illinois could go further to encourage substantive changes in police
practice at an institutional level.4 31
Finally, there are strategic problems associated with civil suits under
the IDVA against individual officers who mistreat victims of domestic
violence. 43 2 If a victim brings suit against the individual police officer
for his misconduct, the officer might be insolvent and the victim would
not be made whole. 4 33 Also, if the individual police officer is found
liable, he might be sanctioned professionally or even fired, but a suit
against the individual officer does not ensure that the police department

107 (1983) (correlating the amount of official liability to the probability that particular misdeeds
will be deterred-more liability results in more deterrence).
428. DARRELL L. Ross, CIVIL LIABILITY IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 6 (3d ed. 2003) (reporting
statistics for settlements from police departments in various populous cities). The majority of
litigation against the police is settled out of court. Id. In New York City alone, the police
department paid out $44 million in settlements for police misconduct from 1987 to 1991. Id.
429. Curcio, supra note 420, at 344-45. "[Slettlements frequently are conditioned upon a
plaintiff's consent to secrecy, even when withholding information from the public presents a risk
to the public health, safety or welfare." Id.
430. Andrea A. Curcio, Painful Publicity-An Alternative Punitive Damage Sanction, 45
DEPAUL L. REV. 341, 357 (1996) (citing failure to publicize settlements and punitive damage
awards as a significant reason why these remedies do not have full deterrent effect).
431. ANN JONES, NEXT TIME, SHE'LL BE DEAD 141 (1994) [hereinafter NEXT TIME]
(discussing how litigation against police departments has encouraged reform within law
enforcement institutions).
432. Note, Government Tort Liability, 111 HARv. L. REV. 2009, 2017 (1998) (listing several
inadequacies of remedies provided in suits against individual officers, including plaintiffs
inability to identify the officer who caused the injury, the inability of police to satisfy judgments
against them, and the fact-finder's reluctance to hold a "hard working, underpaid" police officer
liable).
433. Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense Of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of
Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 854 (2001) (reporting that police who are
liable for damages are not always indemnified by their municipal employers). See also William
C. Mathes & Robert T. Jones, Toward a "Scope of Official Duty" Immunity for Police Officers in
Damage Actions, 53 GEO. L.J. 889, 912 (1965) (characterizing the practice of indemnification
with governmental entities as irregular); Wayne W. Schmidt, Recent Developments In Police
Liability, in POLICE CIVIL LIABILITY 3, 9 (Dr. Leonard Territo, ed., 1984) (reporting that in
Illinois, officers who are found liable in civil suits are only indemnified if their conduct is deemed
negligent).
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as a unit will change its attitudes towards victims of domestic
4 34

violence.
The right of action created by the IDVA and recognized by the

Illinois courts is unique as compared to the remedies established in
Washington, California and New York because of the breadth of
protection it provides specifically to domestic violence victims for a
wide variety of police misconduct. 4 35 Yet, there is room to expand and

strengthen the remedy through further legislative reform and litigation
strategy.

4 36

V. PROPOSAL

In terms of state tort remedies for police misconduct, the unique
437
cause of action created by the IDVA has many advantages.
However, in the spirit of continuing to seek ways to thwart domestic
violence and provide support for victims, the Illinois legislature should
consider several adaptations to the law and the way it is utilized to
expand the rights the claim provides and further its power to correct law
enforcement officer conduct and department policy. 43 8 In response to
the weaknesses of Illinois law with respect to the rights of domestic
violence victims, this Part proposes various judicial and legislative
actions that would bolster the existing remedies and encourage further
43 9
enhancements of police response to domestic violence.
A. FurtherFacilitatethe Victim's Ability to State a Claim
Although the cause of action created by the IDVA creates fewer legal
obstacles prohibiting victims of domestic violence from bringing suit
than do the laws in other states, since its recognition by Calloway in
1996, it has seldom been tested or utilized. 440 Both Moore and Sneed
434. Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 249 (2d. Cir. 2000). In his opinion on the
appropriateness of damage awards for unconstitutional police conduct, Judge Calabresi discussed
the limited deterrent effect of damage awards against individual officers. Id. "[D]amages
premised on individual guilt are unlikely to be efficacious. Moreover, the incapacity of
individual offending officials to pay significant damage awards inevitably limits such officials'
responsiveness to the threat of suits." Id. (citation omitted).
435. See supra Part IV (comparing Illinois' treatment of police immunity in situations of
domestic violence to the varying treatments in California, Washington and New York).
436. See supra Part IV.C (suggesting some flaws in the law in Illinois as it currently exists).
437. See supra Part IV.B (analyzing the strengths and benefits of the cause of action available
to victims of domestic violence under the IDVA).
438. See infra Parts V.A, B & C (proposing some ways in which the Illinois right of action
could be further ameliorated).
439. Id.
440. See generally Sneed v. Howell, 716 N.E.2d 336 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (recognizing the
cause of action created by Calloway); Moore v. Green, 848 N.E.2d 1015 (Ill. 2006) (adopting the
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were examples of successful suits against the police, however they are

among the only cases in which Illinois courts addressed Section 305 of
the IDVA. 441' Additionally, in Illinois and throughout the United States,
suits against police are frequently asserted by the domestic violence
victim's estate. 442 Thus, the legal system should facilitate victimplaintiffs' ability to utilize this cause of action before the police
44 3
misconduct leads to fatalities or serious permanent injury.
In order to facilitate recovery by victims of domestic violence, the
Illinois legislature should codify the requirements necessary to state a
cause of action against the police under the IDVA to make the legal
remedy created by the Calloway decision more widely recognized in the
legal community. 44 4 This would enable non-legal advocates and service

providers who are familiar with the IDVA to learn of the remedy and
educate victims about their rights.44 5 Further guidance should also be
provided by the legislature as to what kind of behavior is actionable in
the domestic violence setting to permit courts throughout Illinois to
44 6
make consistent decisions about when to hold the police liable.

Calloway reasoning).
441. Id.
442. Typically in Illinois, the suits in which plaintiffs prevail against the police involve either
a fatality or a serious physical injury. See generally Sneed, 716 N.E.2d at 338-39 (explaining that
the victim bled to death after she called the police to help protect her from her abuser); Calloway
v. Kinkelaar, 659 N.E.2d 1322, 1324-25 (il. 1995) (reporting that the plaintiff's abusive husband
shot himself before the police could take him into custody); Moore, 848 N.E.2d at 1018 (detailing
the case of a woman who was shot to death by her husband before the police arrived on the
scene). In Calloway, Sneed and Moore, either the abuser or the victim died in the course of the
domestic violence altercation before the police could properly intervene. Id. One of the first
successful suits by a domestic violence victim against the police involved a woman who was
severely beaten and stabbed repeatedly by her husband while a police officer stood nearby.
Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984). See also NEXT TIME, supra
note 431, at 49-53 (recounting in detail the story of Tracey Thurman, her suit against the City of
Torrington police department and the impact her legal victory had on police departments
throughout the country).
443. SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE 160-61 (1982) (suggesting that
litigation against police and police departments are an effective way to enact social change and to
spotlight the "institutional complicity" that allows domestic violence to persist).
444. See supra Part fII.B.1 (describing the Illinois Supreme Court's decision which
recognized the cause of action for victims of domestic violence).
445. See generally Suzanne J. Schmitz, What's the Harm?: Rethinking the Role of Domestic
Violence Advocates and the UnauthorizedPracticeof Law, 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 295
(2004) (discussing issues surrounding domestic violence victims' access to legal remedies).
Many victims of domestic violence do not have access to the legal system for financial and other
practical reasons. Id. at 297-98. And victims who do not have help from those with legal
expertise are often unsuccessfully in obtaining orders of protection or other remedies provided by
the law. Id. at 296. Lay advocates often provide counseling and assistance that would otherwise
be unattainable to victims. Id. at 295.
446. Calloway, 659 N.E.2d at 1327 (recognizing that the determination of what constitutes
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In addition, by lowering the standard for liability from willful and
wanton behavior to negligence, more suits could be initiated for
inappropriate police behavior. 4 47 The current strict standard sends a
pro-police message that most police conduct, even if harmful, is beyond
reprimand. 4 8 It also allows for litigation only when the behavior is
egregious. 44 9 Given the magnitude of the domestic violence problem,
the vulnerable position of victims and the incidence with which police
officers fail to perform their duties, it may be necessary to further limit
immunity for law enforcement in domestic violence situations in order
to spur active and appropriate police response. 4 50 By amending Section
305 to allow civil suit for police conduct that is negligent, police will
have even greater incentive to comply strictly with their training and the
duties outlined in Article III of the IDVA.4 5 1
To suggest that law enforcement immunity be further limited is a
proposal that may be met with criticism, as municipal immunity has a
long history in Illinois jurisprudence and the Illinois Supreme Court has
often noted the importance of police immunity. 45 2 In fact, proponents
of municipal and police immunity from negligence claims traditionally
assert several justifications for preserving immunity for negligent acts
of governmental actors. 4 53 Some argue that it is wrong to allow public
funds meant to be used for the public benefit to be used to remedy

willful and wanton behavior is a line "difficult to draw" and citing to several Illinois courts which
have tried to define such conduct).
447. See SCHUCK, supra note 427, at 100, 111 (suggesting that if "liability for official
misconduct is substantially expanded, society can enjoy significant and unambiguous gains.").
448. Gilles, supra note 433, at 853 (describing the negative effect of pro-police bias as one of
the main critiques of broad law enforcement immunity and suggesting that liability should be
based on social utility of the conduct).
449. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/305 (2004).
450. See supra Part Il.A (describing the omnipresent nature of domestic violence as a crime).
451. Moore v. Green, 848 N.E.2d 1015, 1026 (I1. 2006) (reasoning that Section 305 of the
IDVA is necessary to encourage police officers to fulfill their duties as outlined in Section 304).
For instance, Section 304 requires that a law enforcement officer escort a victim of domestic
violence to her residence to retrieve her personal belongings. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/304
(2004). Even if the officer is merely negligent in performing this duty, there is still a high
probability that the victim could be injured. See also SCHECHTER, supra note 443, at 158
(reporting that sometimes police fail to respond to domestic violence emergency calls, and when
they do respond, they ignore the victim's fear and intimidation and ultimately fall to perform their
duties adequately).
452. See Calloway v. Kinkelaar, 659 N.E.2d 1322, 1327-28 (Ill. 1995) (recognizing the value
of balancing the need to protect victims of domestic violence with the need to shield police
officers from civil suit arising from their good-faith efforts to uphold the law). See also supra
Part I.C (discussing the history and evolution of governmental immunity in Illinois).
453. Note, Municipal Tort Immunity in Virginia, 68 VA. L. REv. 639, 643-49 (1982)
(describing in detail the rationales for governmental immunity from tort suits).
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private injuries. 4 54 Others suggest that by doing away with immunity
for municipal agents, states and municipalities would be exposed to
limitless liability. 45 5 Additionally, it has been argued that eliminating
immunity would interfere with the police officer's discretion and would
cause the officer to conduct his duties under the constant shadow of
4 56
potential liability.
However, despite the arguments in support of immunity for the

police, there have been a growing number of cases criticizing such
broad protection from suit and the rationales listed above have gradually
been considered less persuasive. 4 57 Further, the Illinois state legislature
has found it necessary to limit governmental immunity in other
to domestic
instances, and the gravity of the problem of police response
4 58
violence justifies additional limitations on immunity.
B. Victim-Plaintiffs Should Seek Injunctions
In addition to monetary relief, Illinois courts should issue injunctions
4 59
against police officers or police departments that are found liable.
Injunctive relief would enable the courts to target specific problematic
policies or require certain conduct in a way that could not be
accomplished by the imposition of a financial penalty upon the law
enforcement defendant. 4 60 Such court orders would also have more
454. Id. See also supra note 153 (discussing language from Illinois courts regarding the
importance of preserving tax funds for public purposes as opposed to damage claims).
455. Stewart F. Hancock, Jr., Municipal Liability Through a Judge's Eyes, 44 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 925, 931 (1993).
456. Note, Assessment of Police Conduct During High-Speed Chases in State Tort Liability
Cases: The Effects of Fiser v. City of Ann Arbor and Rogers v. City of Detroit, 46 WAYNE L.
REv. 325, 350 (2000). See also Shea Sullivan, City of Rome v. Jordan: Georgia Is a PublicDuty
Doctrine Jurisdiction With No Waiver of Sovereign Immunity-A Good "Call" by the Supreme
Court, 45 MERCER L. REV. 533, 537 n.18 (1993) ("The need for such broad limitations on
liability in the area of police protection is generally justified by public policy considerations
which center on the functional aspects of police activity [which are] that police require a
substantial amount of discretion ...."). See also supra note 223 (stating the Illinois Supreme
Court's view on partial immunity for law enforcement agents as stated in the Calloway ruling).
457. See Kelly Mahon Tullier, Governmental Liability for Negligent Failureto Detain Drunk
Drivers, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 873, 887 (1992) (explaining increasing disapproval of
governmental immunity and the public duty doctrine which has led courts to "narrow[ ] its scope
or reject[ ] it altogether").
458. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/2-101 (2004). The Illinois Tort Immunity Act provides that,
despite otherwise extensive immunity, the liability of public employees based on certain statutes,
including the Worker's Compensation Act, the Worker's Occupational Disease Act and the
Illinois Uniform Conviction Information Act, remains intact. Id.
459. SCHUCK, supra note 427, at 182-83 (explaining how the federal courts have employed
such alternative remedies to increase specific deterrence of official misconduct and have
successfully avoided the pitfalls of other public tort remedies).
460. Id. at 150 (describing the change achieved by such remedies as "more specific,
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impact on larger municipalities who, in the face of monetary sanctions,
might be willing to pay the judgment in cases in which a victim-plaintiff
prevailed without enacting systemic change. 4 6 1 Although some experts

suggest that injunctions would only be useful in departments where
police misconduct is severe and pervasive, 46 2 this may be the case in
many circumstances considering the prevailing attitude of intolerance
46 3
and misunderstanding by police towards domestic violence victims.

By employing injunctive relief to require the amelioration of police
conduct and department policy with regard to intimate partner abuse,
future populations of domestic violence victims would benefit from the
success of a particular victim's litigation. 46 4 In the public sector, this
predictable and rapid"). Injunctions can take two forms: prohibitory and affirmative. Schmidt,
supra note 433, at 10. Prohibitory injunctions prevent officers from participating in certain
conduct. Id. Affirmative injunctions require departments to take action to correct past
misconduct. Id.
461. SCHECHTER, supra note 443, at 160 (describing mandated reform stemming from a classaction suit against the New York City Police Department in which practices and policies
regarding the treatment of domestic violence incidences were dramatically altered to ameliorate
law enforcement response). See also Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 3 (1979) (illustrating how systemic problems can be decreased when a judge orders
structural reform through injunctions); Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets,
Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 416-17 (2000)
(hypothesizing that, in the context of unconstitutional governmental conduct, complex injunctions
successfully prevent misconduct where "a majority is willing to bear the costs of paying
compensation or where a powerful interest group benefits from the [inappropriate] activity.").
462. Levinson, supra note 461, at 417 (suggesting that "[s]tructural reform brings enormous
difficulties and costs, however, and may only be worthwhile in circumstances of severe and
pervasive government wrongdoing").
463. See supra Part II.B (outlining the role of police officers in situations of domestic violence
and presenting some of the reasons for under enforcement of domestic violence laws). Injunctive
relief would work to change police behavior and policy much like the consent judgment agreed
upon by the parties in Bruno v. Codd. Bruno v. Codd, 393 N.E.2d 976 (N.Y. 1979). In Bruno,
twelve victims of domestic violence brought suit seeking injunctive relief against the New York
City Police Department, the Family Court in New York City and officials of the New York City
Department of Probation for their failure to protect domestic violence victims. Bruno, 393 N.E.2d
at 977. As a result of the suit, the police department negotiated a consent judgment with the
plaintiffs, whereby it agreed to ameliorate its policies and standards. Id. at 980. The court found
this agreement sufficiently satisfied the plaintiffs' claims, such as to obviate the need for
injunctive relief against the remaining defendants. Id. The court stated:
By its terms the police have agreed hereafter to respond swiftly to every request for
protection and, as in an ordinary criminal case, to arrest the husband whenever there is
reasonable cause to believe that a felony has been committed against the wife or that an
order of protection or temporary order of protection has been violated. Moreover,
officers are to remain at the scene of the alleged crime or violation in order to terminate
or prevent the commission of further offenses and to provide the wife with other
assistance. To assure that these undertakings are fulfilled, supervisory police officers
are to make all necessary revisions in their disciplinary and other regulations.
Id. at 980.
464. See Christina Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5, 51-52 (1980)
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type of remedy has historically been very successful in initiating long-

term and permanent reform in a way that monetary damages have
not. 465 Even though only minimal numbers of victims will have the
resources and courage to challenge the actions of the police who
inadequately respond to their emergency calls, any success achieved by
those representative plaintiffs in the form of injunctive relief would
benefit other victims who cannot come forward.4 6 6
C. Litigation Between Victims and Law
Enforcement Should Be Publicized
The legislature should also require policing institutions to publicize
litigation against them by domestic violence victims to reveal
institutional flaws and police misconduct. 4 67 The legislature should
require law enforcement agencies to actively report the details of police
misconduct giving rise to legal action to members of the community
46 8

either by way of mass media or another form of community alert.

Notifying the public of cases brought by victims of domestic violence
under the IDVA would increase officer accountability to the community
and would facilitate citizens' ability to learn of law enforcement
inadequacies with regard to domestic violence response without having
to personally search the public record.4 69 Because such publicity would

(explaining that one of the benefits of equitable relief over monetary damages is that they can be
more profitably employed by courts to deter future wrongs).
465. Gilles, supra note 433, at 876 (calling injunctions "uniquely appropriate remed[ies]" for
the public sector and citing Roe v. Wade and Brown v. Board of Education as cases in which
"plaintiffs
sought to reform the institutions, laws, or customs that had injured them" and
"sought not only redress for themselves, but protection for society at large against the harms they
had personally suffered").
466. Id.
467. See Curcio, supra note 430, at 357 (explaining that, in the corporate context, public
knowledge of punitive awards and the reason for the grant of those awards leads to increased
deterrence of misconduct). The case of Tracey Thurman, who successfully sued the city in which
she lived for failure to protect her from her abusive estranged husband was widely publicized in
not only the legal and law enforcement communities but also in the popular culture. See NEXT
TIME, supra note 431, at 49-53 (discussing the Thurman case). The details of the case, which
was one of the first to bring attention to the problem of inadequate police response to domestic
violence, was even made into a television movie entitled A Cry For Help: The TracY Thurman
Story. Id. In response to the multi-million-dollar verdict against the city and its police
department, law enforcement agencies and municipalities throughout the nation began to
strengthen policies for handling domestic violence in order to prevent being held liable
themselves. Id.
468. See Curcio, supra note 430, at 343 n.8. "To enable the information publicized to reach as
wide an audience as possible, it is important that the information be publicized in print and
broadcast media forums as well as on the 'information superhighway'." Id.
469. Id. at 358 (describing that public notification of defendant wrongdoing, in both criminal
and civil law, serves to educate and protect the public, deter further offenses and further the
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result in public scrutiny and activism, municipalities and police
departments would have the incentive to make positive changes to

support domestic violence victims within their organizations in order to
avoid lawsuits and negative publicity. 4 70 Additionally, over the course
of litigation, valuable information about police practices could be

exposed, providing community leaders and domestic violence advocates
with knowledge of problem areas upon which to focus their reform
47 1
efforts.
Further, the IDVA should be amended to require that settlement
information and figures be reported to the public and the media in order
to prevent police departments from paying the plaintiff simply to avoid
uncovering their inadequacies. 472 For instance, the Moore case received
rehabilitation of the offender). For instance, the publication of wrongdoing has been employed to
educate and safeguard the public in the case of sexual offender registration requirements and to
encourage manufacturers' compliance in products liability litigation. See, e.g. Catherine L.
Carpenter, The Constitutionalityof Strict Liability in Sex Offender RegistrationLaws, 86 B.U. L.
REv. 295, 326-27 (2006) (addressing the rationale behind Megan's Law which requires
convicted sexual offenders to submit certain information to a database that is accessible to law
enforcement and the public); Rosalind K. Kelley, Comment, Sentenced to Wear the Scarlet
Letter: Judicial Innovations in Sentencing-Are They Constitutional?, 93 DICK. L. REv. 759,
768-71 (1989) (illustrating the way in which the historical concept of public humiliation as a
form of punishment has been adapted into contemporary forms of punishment); Richard S.
Gruner, Beyond Fines: Innovative Corporate Sentences Under FederalSentencing Guidelines, 71
WASH. U. L.Q. 261, 320-23 (1993) (explaining how adverse publicity, in the corporate context,
increases deterrence and accountability on the part of the offending party).
470. DONALD 0. SCHULTZ, THE POLICE As THE DEFENDANT 56 (1984) (outlining the
negative impact publicity of police misconduct can have on the individual officer). See also
Gilles, supra note 433, at 860 (citing commentators' theory that institutional change is induced by
the desire to avoid adverse publicity); Curcio, supra note 420, at 372-73 (suggesting that scrutiny
of practices and policies that result from publicity of an award reduces the likelihood that the
misconduct will reoccur).
471. Curcio, supra note 420, at 372-73 (discussing how publication of wrongdoing
encourages internal and external scrutiny that leads to reformed practice); Frank Main & Fran
Spielman, Watching cops who rack up complaints: 20 claims from public triggerofficial action,
CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 23, 2006, at 6 (describing how publicized scandals have placed the
spotlight on police misconduct and have caused more departmental accountability for incidents of
wrongdoing). See also Gilles, supra note 433, at 859 ("When [ ] tort victims pursue litigation,
motivated by the availability of compensatory damages, valuable information is unearthed and
exposed.").
472. See Emily Fiftal, Note, Respecting Litigants' Privacy and Public Needs: Striking Middle
Ground in an Approach to Secret Settlements, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 503, 503 (2003). Many
settlements are made pursuant to confidentiality agreements and do not become public record
unless the parties file the information with a court to later be able to enforce the terms of the
settlement agreement. Id. at 504. Orders by the court and other court records, such as jury
verdicts and court decisions, can be sealed to prevent public access. Id. at 506. Thus, the media
and the general public would not be privy to these records and information unless the parties
agreed to its disclosure or the court mandates that the information be unsealed. Id. Some
advocates for the public argue that certain categories of cases, such as products liability and
sexual assault should be made accessible because of the strong public interest that exists in the

830

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 38

large amounts of publicity given the size of the settlement, the nature of
the crime, and the media sound bites of the 911 tapes of White's last
living moments. 4 73 This exposure heightened awareness throughout the
City of Chicago about the ongoing frequency of domestic violence and
the failure of police to properly respond.4 74
Some scholars and attorneys argue that divulging such private
4 75
litigation information may not be in the best interest of the victim.
By agreeing to keep court records sealed, victims may be able to extract
larger settlement sums. 4 76 Additionally, it has been suggested that if
victims want to keep the information about their lawsuit private, the
courts should not prevent them from doing so.4 77 In situations of
domestic violence, where victims are already reluctant to report their
injuries for a number of reasons, protecting the victim's privacy should
they choose to litigate might be a competing concern to be weighed
against the public's right to the information. 478 Although a balancing
test may be appropriate to weigh the privacy interest of the victim
against the public's right to know of law enforcement misconduct, the
social utility and public policy arguments favoring the disclosure of this
information are great. 479 Additionally, some courts have rejected the
argument that publicizing the suit would embarrass the parties or
damage their reputation, as injury to personal reputation is "an inherent
'
risk in almost every civil suit. "480

information. Id. at 505-06.
473. See supra notes 1-2, 5 & 7 (describing the numerous newspaper articles and television
programs that publicized White's murder, the criminal conviction of her husband, and the civil
suit against officers Green and Cornelius).
474. Id.
475. Sharon L. Sobczak, To Seal or Not to Seal?: In Search of Standards, 60 DEF. COUNS. J.
406, 407 (1993) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of choosing to seal court records
for both plaintiffs and defendants).
476. Id. (explaining that plaintiffs may be able to use the option of agreeing to confidentiality
as a bargaining chip over the course of litigation).
477. Id. (describing that some view litigation as a form of dispute resolution between private
parties and that information regarding that process should be kept from the public purview if the
parties so desire).
478. See supra Part I.A (discussing the obstacles that prevent domestic violence victims from
reporting abuse).
479. See Anne-Th6r~se B6champs, Note, Sealed Out-of-Court Settlements: When Does the
Public Have a Right to Know?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 117, 127-28 (1990) (outlining the
competing interests involved with the unsealing of court documents and discussing the balancing
test employed by judges in determining whether or not to unseal the information).
480. Id.
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D. Encourage Victims to Sue Police Departments Directly

Finally, to ensure that law enforcement agencies are fully accountable

for their shortcomings with respect to response and treatment of
domestic violence calls, victims who elect to bring suit should be

encouraged to sue police departments directly for the misconduct of
their officers. 4 8 1 By adjudicating the culpability of municipalities or
departments, as whole entities as opposed to the individual officer, the

harmful behavior cannot be blamed on a few "bad apples" in the police
force. 4 82 Sanctions against specific officers would not sufficiently
address the problem and thus further institutional change would be
48 3
required to address the totality of the deficiency.
Bringing suit against a police department or municipality would also
prevent the negative implications of holding individual defendants
liable. 4 84 When officers are aware that they personally are at greater
risk of being sued civilly, they often change their behavior to avoid the
hazardous situation altogether.4 85 Police officers may choose not to act
or to delay action in order to minimize the opportunities that open them
up to liability. 486 This self-protective behavior would simply reinforce
the under-enforcement problem that exists with police response to

481. Note, supra note 432, at 2017. "The goal of providing compensation for victims of
tortious conduct is enhanced under a system of governmental, not individual, liability." Id.
482. Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering "Custom' in Section
1983 Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REv. 17, 31 (2002) (explaining the "bad apple theory"
which stands for the proposition that, in the context of damage awards for constitutional claims
against the police, when individuals are found liable, municipalities are less likely to make
significant changes to correct improper officer behavior because they can fault particular
officers).
483. Whitman, supra note 464, at 49-50 (explaining that awards against individuals are not
the most effective way to avoid future injuries as many problems arise from systemic flaws); see
also Note, supra note 432, at 2017 (discussing problems of holding individuals liable).
484. Note, supra note 432, at 2014-16 (describing in detail the police reaction to being held
personally liable for tortious behavior).
485. Gilles, supra note 482, at 31 (explaining that self-protective behavior often prevents the
officers from vigorously performing their duties); see also Note, supra note 432, at 2015
(suggesting that, in the face of liability, government agents will consciously seek to minimize
personal risk by exercising certain strategies).
486. SCHUCK, supra note 427, at 71-73, 75 (describing in detail the way in which public
officials and employees use inaction and delay to avoid liability; also describing how officials
may substitute a risky kind of action for another relatively faultless act, "[p]arole officers may
refrain from recommending release in order to minimize the risk of being sued by potential
victims" or "[s]upervisors may promote ... malingering or disruptive employees in order to be
free of them rather than invite a suit for wrongful dismissal").
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domestic violence. 4 87 By suing the law enforcement agency as a whole,
48 8
the plaintiff could prevent this unfavorable reaction.
VI. CONCLUSION

Victims of domestic violence are a vulnerable population exposed to
a dangerous, repetitive, and often fatal crime. They rely heavily on law
enforcement personnel to keep them safe and cannot afford to be
subjected to further danger resulting from police misconduct. Illinois
created an effective tool through civil litigation to encourage police
officers to comply with proper protocol and to allow victims to recover
from wrongdoings suffered at the hands of the police. However, the
cause of action created by Illinois law is only the first important step in
protecting victims of domestic violence. In order to guarantee that law
enforcement agencies and employees effectively respond to intimate
partner abuse, the Illinois legislature and courts need to increase the
ability of victims to prevail in civil suits against the police and
encourage society to react accordingly when the police are found to
have acted inappropriately.

487. See supra Part II.A (describing the important role of police officers in deterring domestic
violence and inadequate response).
488. Gilles, supra note 482, at 31 (reasoning that suing municipalities, as opposed to
individual officers, for § 1983 violation better serves the recovery goals of the plaintiff).

